Law Commission of India Report No. 56
Statutory Provision As to Notice of Suit Other Than Section 80, Civil Procedure Code
Forwarded to the Union Minister of Law and Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India by Justice P.B. Gajendragadkar, Chairman, Law Commission of India, on May 14, 1973.
Minister of Law,
Justice & Company Affairs,
Government of India,
My Dear Minister,
I have great pleasure in forwarding herewith the 56th Report of the Law Commission on statutory provisions as to notice of suit.
The circumstances in which the subject was taken up by the Law Commission are stated in the opening paragraph of the Report. The provisions dealt with are analogous to section 80, Civil Procedure Code, on which the Commission has recently made a Report (54th Report, in February 1973). The matter was therefore dealt with on an urgent basis, so that Government may, while considering implementation of the Commission's Report on the Code of Civil Procedure, also take into account the Commission's recommendations on the provisions in question.
The matter being urgent for the reasons stated above, it was not considered to issue a Press communique for inviting views. But the Commission's tentative proposals on the subject were circulated to the Ministries administratively concerned with the provisions under consideration. The comments received by the specified date (30th April, 1973) have received the Commission's due consideration.
The questions for consideration were studied and a draft Report was prepared by the Member-Secretary. This was considered by the Commission at length, and has been revised in the light of the discussions held in the Commission.With warm personal regards, Yours sincerely, P.B. Gajendragadkar
Statutory Provision As to Notice of Suit Other Than Section 80, Civil Procedure Code
"A person shall not be entitled to a refund of an overcharge in respect of animals or goods carried by railway or to compensation for the loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods delivered to be so carried, unless his claim to the refund or compensation has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf to the railway administration within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway."1. For history of section 77, see Appendix. 4. Requirement of notice mandatory, under the Railways Act.—After the amendment of 1961, the section has been renumbered as section 78B, and certain textual modifications also made. But the broad requirement of "notice" (claim) within six months, remains unaffected. This provision is similar to section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, in so far as it requires prior notice of suit. It also lays down a period of limitation. The present section on the subject—section 78B, Railways Act—is as follows:—
"78B. A person shall not be entitled to a refund of an overcharge in respect of animals or goods carried by railway or to compensation for the loss, destruction, damage, deterioration or non-delivery of animals or goods delivered to be so carried, unless his claim to the refund or compensation has been preferred in writing by him or on his behalf—
(a) to the railway administration to which the animals or goods were delivered to be carried by railway, or
(b) to the railway administration on whose railway the destination station lies, or the loss, destruction, damage or deterioration occurred, within six months from the date of the delivery of the animals or goods for carriage by railway:
Provided that any information demanded or inquiry made in writing from, or any complaint made in writing to, any of the railway administrations mentioned above by or on behalf of the person within the said period of six months regarding the non-delivery or delay in delivery of the animals or goods with particulars sufficient to identify the consignment of such animals or goods shall, for the purposes of this section, be deemed to be a claim to the refund or compensation."5. It is well established that requirements of this section are mandatory1, and failure to comply with its provisions will result in the dismissal of the suit in limine. However, a combined notice given under section 77 (before the amendment of 1961) of the Railways Act and section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure is valid.2 1. Union of India v. Haji Jiwakhan, AIR 1962 MP 374. 2. (a) Union of India v. Meghraj Khubchaud, 4962 MPLJ (cited in the yearly Digest); (b) Madho Prasad v. Union of India, AIR 1961 All 433. 6. Section 273, Cantonments Act, 1924.—The next provision to be considered is in the Cantonments Act,1 which is as follows:—
"273. (1) No suit shall be instituted against any Board or against any member of a Board, or against any officer or servant of a Board, in respect of any act done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act or of any rule or bye-law made thereunder, until the expiration of two months after notice in writing has been left at the office of the Board, and, in the case of such member, officer or servant, unless notice in writing has also been delivered to him or left at his office or place of abode, and unless such notice states explicitly the cause of action, the nature of the relief sought, the amount of compensation claimed, and the name and place of abode of the intending plaintiff, and unless the plaint contains a statement that such notice has been so delivered or left.
(3) No suit, such as is described in sub-section (1) shall, unless it is an action for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be instituted after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arises.
(4).............."Sub-section (1) of section 273, quoted above, is similar to section 80, Code of Civil Procedure. Sub-section (3) of the section imposes a special period of limitation. 1. Section 273, Cantonments Act, 1924. 7. Case-Law on section 273, Cantonments Act.—Case-Law on section 273 of the Cantonments Act1 may now be referred to, in brief. The facts of an Allahabad case2 were as follows:
"Where, after the commencement of this Act, any action, prosecution or other proceeding is commenced in the United Kingdom against any person for any act done in pursuance or execution or intended execution of any Act of Parliament, or of any public duty or authority or in respect of any alleged neglect or default in the execution of any such act, duty or authority, the following provisions shall have effect:(a) The action, prosecution, or proceeding shall not lie or be instituted unless it is commenced within six months next after the act, neglect, or default complained of, or in a case of continuance of injury or damage, within six months next after the ceasing thereof." 1. Ramchander Sahai v. Cantonment Board, Meerut, AIR 1947. 2. Cantonment Board, Allahabad v. Hazarilal, AIR 1934 All 436. 3. Section 1, Public Authorities Protection Act, 1893 (Eng). 4. The English Act was repealed in 1954. 9. The question of interpretation of the provisions of section 273 of the Cantonments Act, 1924, arose before the High Court of Punjab also.1 The facts of the case were as follows:
(2) No proceeding other than a suit shall be commenced against the Central Government or any officer of the Government or a local authority for anything purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act without giving the Central Government or such officer a month's previous notice in writing of the intended proceeding and of the cause thereof, or after the expiration of three months from accrual of such cause2."It may be noted that this section does not apply to suits. In other respects, it is broadly similar to section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure, though the period of notice is only one month, as contrasted with the period of two months provided for in section 80, Civil Procedure Code. 1. Section 155(2), Customs Act, 1962. 2. Compare section 198, Sea Customs Act, 1878 (repealed). 14. Expression 'Local authorities' in Customs Act.—Section 198 of the Sea Customs Act, 1878, provided that no proceeding other than a suit shall be commenced against any person for anything purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act, without giving to such person a month's previous notice in writing of the intended proceeding and of the cause thereof. This Act was repealed by the Customs Act, 1962. In the Customs Act, 1962 it has been laid down in section 155(2) that no proceeding other than a suit shall be commenced against the Central Government or any officer of the Government or a local authority for anything purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act, without giving the Central Government or such officer a month's previous notice in writing of the intended proceeding and of the cause thereof. The words 'local authority' have not been defined in the Customs Act, 1962, but section 3(31) of the General Clauses Act lays down that 'local authority' shall mean a municipal committee, district Board, body of Port Commissioners or other authority legally entitled to or authorised by the Government with the control or management of a municipal or local fund. 15. It has been provided in section 6 of the Customs Act, 1962, that the Central Government may entrust to any officer of the Central or the State Government or a local authority any functions of the Board or any officer of Customs under this Act. Under section 151(c) of the Act, specified officers of the local authorities are empowered and required to assist officers of Customs in the execution of this Act. 16. No case appears to have been reported under section 155(2) of the Customs Act, 1962 regarding giving of the required notice to a local authority or the officers of a local authority. 16A. No bar to proceedings under Article 226.—It has been held by Calcutta High Court1 that section 198 of the Sea Customs Act (which was the predecessor of section 155 of the Customs Act, 1962,) was not a bar to the proceedings under Article 226 of the Constitution against the order of the Customs Authorities2. 1. (a) Sooraj Mull Nagar Mull v. Assistant Collector of Customs, AIR 1952 Cal 103. (b) Assistant Collector of Customs v. Sooraj Mull Nagar Mull, AIR 1952 Cal 656. 2. Similar is the position as regards other provisions. 17. Section 120, Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.—The fifth provision is in the Major Port Trusts Act,1 which provides .for notice of suit. It is quoted below:— 1. Section 120, Major Port Trusts Act, 1963.
"120. Limitation of proceedings in respect of things done under the Act—No suit or other proceeding shall be commenced against a Board or any member or employee thereof for anything done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act until the expiration of one month after notice in writing has been given to the Board or him, stating the cause of action, or after six month after the accrual of the cause of action."This provision covers suits and other proceedings. In other respects, it is similar to section 80 of the Code of Civil Procedure. 18. Sections in other Port Trusts Act.—It may be noted that this section corresponds to section 142 of the Calcutta Port Trusts Act, 1800, section 87 of the Bombay Port Trusts Act, 1870 and section 110 of the Madras Port Trusts Act, 1905. No decision on the section in the Major Port Trusts Act appears to have been reported. 19. Requirement of notice of a common feature.—The provisions referred to above, while differing from one another in matters of detail, all share a common feature, namely, the requirement to give notice of suit (or proceeding) as a condition precedent to the institution of a suit (or proceeding). The period varies. So does the mode of computation of the period. Either the notice is required to be given within a particular period from the date of the cause of action, or the notice should have been given on a certain date prior to the suit. But, in some form or other, notice becomes a condition precedent. We shall now proceed to consider the possible grounds on which the requirement of notice could be supported. 20. Object of notice considered.—In the first place, such a notice could be regarded as desirable in order to give the authority concerned (the Railway Administration, the Cantonments Board, the Port Trust or other authority) an opportunity to settle the claim and thus to avoid unnecessary litigation. Secondly, at least in the case of some of the provisions referred to above1, the notice may be intended to prevent the presentation of stale demands, particularly where the authority to be sued has to handle innumerable transactions in the course of which liability could possibly arise in favour of the citizen. 1. E.g., section 78B, Railways Act, (para. 4, supra). 21. Object of Provisions in the Railways Act.—Thus, for example, explaining the object of the notice prescribed by section 77, Railways Act, the Supreme Court has said, "the object of service of notice under this provision is essentially to enable the railway administration to make an enquiry and investigation as to whether the loss, destruction or deterioration was due to the consignor's laches or to the wilful neglect of the railway administration and its servants and further to prevent stale and possibly dishonest claims being made when owing to delay, it may be practically impossible to trace the transaction or check the allegations, made by the consignor........1" The Supreme Court observed:—
"In enacting the section, the intention of the legislature must have been to afford only a protection to the railway administration against fraud and not to provide means for depriving the consignors of their legitimate claims for compensation for the loss of or damage caused to their consignments during the course of transit on the railways."1. Jetnntll v. D.H. Rly., AIR 1962 SC 1879. 22. Discrimination not to be favoured.—As against those possible grounds of justification for the present provisions, it should be stated that prima facie such provisions are discriminatory and against the general principle of equality. It may not be improper to mention here that, in practice, the first object of these provisions, namely, to give an opportunity to the authority concerned to settle the claims, is hardly realised. Experience of the working of the corresponding provisions in the Code of Civil Procedure1 has unfortunately shown that, for reasons into which we need not go, the notice of suit against the Government or public officer given under that Code is not acted upon within the time contemplated by the law. We venture to think that the position under the special statutory provisions with which this Report is concerned is not substantially different in this respect. 1. Section 80, Code of Civil Procedure, 1908. 23. Reasons given in earlier Reports for recommending deletion of section 80, Code of Civil Procedure.—It may be noted that several reasons weighed with the Law Commission1 in recommending deletion of section 80, Civil Procedure Code. In the first place, the evidence taken by the Law Commission for the purposes of an earlier Report2 disclosed that in a large majority of cases the Governments or the public officers made no use of the opportunity afforded by the section. Secondly, the same evidence disclosed3 that in a large number of cases Governments and public officers utilised section 80 mainly to raise technical defences contending either that no notice had been given or that the notice, though given, did not comply with the requirements of the section. Thirdly, the Commission was of the view that in a democratic country there should be no distinction of the kind envisaged by section 80 between the citizen and the State. A welfare State should have no such privileges as are needed4 by a police State in the matter of litigation, and should have no higher status than an ordinary litigant in this respect4. 1. 27th Report (Code of Civil Procedure), paras. 50-52; and also 54th Report. 2. 14th Report, Vol. I. 3. 14th Report, Vol. I. 4. 27th Report (Code of Civil Procedure), para. 52. 24. These reasons applicable to provisions in question.—These reasons apply with equal force to the provisions with which this Report is concerned. 25. Difficulties created by provision in Railways Act.—For example, as to section 77, Railways Act (now replaced by section 78B)1, nice questions as to the scope of the section arose in the past. Many of these have been set at rest. Here, we are referring to a few of them, to show how uncertainty could arise and might cause injustice. Thus, two problems raised by section 77 were
(i) Whether the provisions of section 77 applied to cases of compensation for non-delivery or not2, and
(ii) Whether under section 77, notice was required to be given to all the railway administrations which had carried the goods3.1. Para. 4, supra. 2. See now, G.G. in Council v. Musaddi La!, AIR 1961 SC 725, followed in Union of India v. Mahadeo Lal, AIR 1965 SC 1755. 3. See Jethmull v. D.H. Rly., AIR 1962 SC 1870. 26. Judicial criticism.—No doubt, some of the points have been settled by judicial decisions or by statutory amendments. But the very fact that such controversies arose show the difficulties created by the section. Unfortunately, there have been occasions where the courts had to criticise the conduct of the Railway authorities in raising the defence of want of notice. In one of the Calcutta1 cases, for example, Henderson J., made weighty though caustic observations as to the plea taken by the railway. In a Patna case2, in a very well considered judgment by Courtney Torrell C.J. and Fazl Ali J., it was pointed out that one of the defences taken by the railway company was the familiar, though somewhat disingenuous contention that a claim in writing had not been preferred. 1. Srinthidar Mandol v. Governor-General-in-Council, AIR 1954 Cal 412: 49 CWN 240. 2. D.N. Railway v. Maharaja Kameshwar Singh, ILR 12 Pat 67 (71): AIR 1933 Pat 45. 27. In another Calcutta case1, the High Court was constrained to make the following observations:
"Every step taken by the railway officials was as improper and as illegal as it could be. But, far from being apologetic for their irregular and high handed behaviour they have sought to escape from their just liabilities by raising the plea that they have not received the notice of claim, required by section 77, Railways Act and this plea has been accepted by a Judge, and a Full Bench of the Small Cause Court."1. Shamsul Haq v. Secretary of State, AIR 1931 Cal 332 (334) (Lord Williams J.). 28. In a Patna case1, the Full Bench, after referring to a few cases, observed—
"In other words, the railway, in order to defeat the claims of the claimant, does not hesitate to take up unattractive disingenuous, if not uncommendable and contradictory, defences."1. Governor-General-in-Council v. G.S. Mills, AIR 1949 Pat 347 (351) (FB). 29. Even some of the more recent cases make interesting reading. In a Madhya Pradesh case1, for example, while sending notice under section 77, counsel had, by mistake, sent his office copy which was unsigned. The Railway challenged the validity of the notice. Fortunately, the High Court held that this mistake did not affect its validity. 1. Union of India v. Hotnal Chand, 1966 MPLJ (Notes) 150, cited in the Yearly Digest (1966), Col. 2295. 30. A recent Kerala1 case illustrates the difficulty that exists in relation to interpretation of the words "for carriage by railway", and the word "preferred", in section 78B. 1. Union of India v. Lakshmi Textiles, AIR 1968 Ker 23. 31. Even in 1969, an objection was put-forth that notice of claim served on the Refunds Officer was not valid under section 78B1, even though the Ministry of Railways had issued a pamphlet stating that the Refunds Officer may receive such notices. 1. Brooke Bond India (Private) Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 1969 Cal 39. 31A. Inconvenience.—The inconvenience caused by such technical plans is, thus, apparent. As has been observed by one Australian writer1 with reference to an analogous provision in an Act in force in Victoria (Australia),—
"Numerous indeed are the unfortunates who, through mistake or for some other reason, have failed to give the necessary notice."32. Stale demands guarded against by law of limitation.—As regards the object of preventing the making of stale demands, that could be achieved by the general law of limitation, and we do not see any reason why there should be special provision requiring the giving of a notice (or submission of claims) to the authority concerned within a specified period, for suits concerning the matters to which the provisions in question apply. Moreover, it should be stated that in practice, prospective litigants will always take care, in their own interest, to give a notice to the authority concerned before filing a suit. 33. Inconvenience and injustice.—In our view, the inconvenience and injustice caused by the various provisions for notice, outweigh the possible advantages of those provisions. 33A. Comments of Ministries concerned.—We had, before finalising the recommendation, invited the views of the Ministries concerned. One of the Ministries has offered the following comments1 with reference to section 273, Cantonments Act:—
"It is considered that the provision of giving 2 months notice in section 273 affords protection to the Cantonment Board and its officials and an opportunity to make amends, if necessary. It does not appear to cause any undue hardship and injustice to anybody."In the circumstances, the Ministry favours retention of the provision for notice. We may, in this connection, reiterate what we have already stated2, that mandatory notice does not lead to any practical advantage and that in practice, if notice is not given, the Court can award costs. In the comment received from the Ministry' concerned with the Major Port Trust3 Act, it is stated that the provision in that Act, (and similar provisions in the Acts relating to Bombay and Madras Port Trust)4-5 are helpful and necessary for the purpose of obtaining the relevant information and documents from various quarters in order to settle the cases, if possible, out of court. In the absence of this provision, it is stated, it would also not be possible for the Port Trust to gather the required information or material in time for defending the suit, if a suit is ultimately filed. It has been conceded that in some quarters this provision may not have been properly utilised; but the real remedy (it is stated) lies in making it obligatory for the concerned officer of the Department to give a proper reply within the statutory period or to seek extension of the time. It is, lastly, stated that the contention that in a democratic country observance of the distinctions of the kind envisaged by section 80, Code of Civil Procedure between the citizens and the State will be invidious, "is only partly true", as "the State has to be supreme in order to keep the welfare of the citizens before it in everything it does. If this be so, the inclusion or retention of the special provision cannot be assailed." We have given our anxious thought to these points, but we regret that we are unable to agree. We do not, in the first place, regard a statutory provision for notice (as a condition precedent to litigation) as indispensable or necessary in order to enable Department concerned to collect the material for defending the suit. In practice, as is well known, the prospective plaintiff does not usually rush to court without calling upon the Department to redress the alleged illegality; if he dares to do so, he runs the risk of being denied the costs of the suit. Settling the claim can be done even after the suit is filed. Secondly, under the Civil Procedure Code, reasonable time is allowed to every defendant to file his defence; and if within that time, he makes a reasonable offer of settlement, the court is not precluded from taking that into account in exercising its discretion as to costs. Thirdly, as regards the suggested alternative remedy of requiring the appropriate officer to send a proper reply to the notice within the specified time, or to seek extension, we think that it would hardly be workable. If the officer concerned does not send a reply, the question of consequences of non-compliance will arise. Controversies are also bound to arise as to whether the reply sent was adequate, and so on. The suggested alternative would hardly be an improvement on the present position. Finally, as regards the point made about the supreme position of the State and its duty to secure the welfare of the citizens, we may state that what we are recommending does not, in any way, come in the way of the performance of that duty. 1. Ministry of Defence, letter No. 793-C/D (Q&C), dated 18th April, 1973. 2. Paras. 32-33, supra. 4. Comment of the Ministry of Shipping and Transport dated 3rd May, 1973. (a) Section 85, Bombay Port Trusts Act, 1897; (b)Section 110, Madras Port Trust Act, 1905. 5. Cf. para. 18, supra. 34. Recommendation.—In the light of what is stated above, we recommend that the provisions in question, in so far as they require the service of notice as a condition precedent to the institution of a suit or other proceeding, should be deleted. So much of these provisions as relates to the periods of limitation for the institution of suit or proceeding will, of course, remain unaffected by our recommendation.1 1. See also paras. 36-37, infra. 35. Period of limitation under the Limitation Act, 1963 for a suit for compensation for loss, destruction or deterioration of animals or goods delivered to be carried by railway.—We have considered the question whether our recommendation, in so far as it affects section 78B Railways Act1, renders it desirable to make any change in the Limitation Act in respect of the period of limitation for suits for compensation for loss etc. of goods carried on railway. The Limitation Act, 1963, Article 30 provided one year as the period of Limitation for suits against a carrier for compensation for loss of or injury to goods. On the recommendation of the Law Commission2, the Limitation Act of 1963 has provided the period of three years3 as the period of limitation for such suits. 1. Para. 27, supra. 2. Law Commission of India, 3rd Report (Limitation Act), para. 72. 3. Article 10, Limitation Act, 1963. 36. We do not think that any modification of the period of limitation provided in respect of suits against the Railways1 is required. In practice, there is not much likelihood of stale demands or dishonest claims, because the normal period of limitation would still apply. 1. Article 10, Limitation Act, 1963. 37. Effect of recommendation indicated with reference to each provision.—Our recommendation will involve
"(3) No suit against any Board or against any member of a Board, or against any officer or servant of a Board, in respect of any act done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act or of any rule3 or bye-law made thereunder, shall, unless it is a suit for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto, be instituted after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arises."(iii) Section 478, Delhi Municipal Corporation Act, 1957, (66 of 1957), should be revised as follows:—
"478. (1) No suit shall be instituted against the Corporation or against any municipal authority or against any municipal officer or other municipal employee or against any person acting under the order or direction of any municipal authority or any municipal officer or other municipal employee, in respect of any act done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this act or any rule, regulation or bye-law made thereunder, after the expiry of six months from the date on which the cause of action arises.
(2) Nothing in sub-section (1) shall apply to a suit for the recovery of immovable property or for a declaration of title thereto (iv) Section 155(2) of the Customs Act, 1962, should be revised as follows—
"(2) No proceeding other than a suit shall be commenced against the Central Government or any officer of the Government or any officer of a local authority for anything purporting to be done in pursuance of this Act, after the expiration of three months from the accrual of the cause of action for such proceeding"(v) Section 120 of the Major Port Trusts Act, 1963 should be revised as follows:—
"120. No suit or other proceedings shall be commenced against a Board or any member or employee thereof for anything done, or purporting to have been done, in pursuance of this Act after six months after the accrual of the cause of action."
History of Section 77, Railways Act, 1890Section 77 of the Railways Act corresponded to an executive order1, which provided for notification of claims to refund of overcharges and compensation for loses etc,2 in respect of goods carried by railways. At the time when the Indian Railways Bill was under consideration, it was observed3 with reference to Clause 77—
"This validates the Bill of a rule at present of a very doubtful legality. One would date the six months period from the date on which the overcharge was intimated, or the loss, destruction or deterioration became known to him. Might the rule not be made subject to 'reasonable and sufficient cause' for delay?".It may also be noted that when the Bill, was under consideration, certain authorities suggested4 (in the correspondence on the Bill) that the period of six months was too long, and that 2 months was sufficient to claim the refund of overcharges or compensation in respect of animals and goods.5 There was a comment from a Lieutenant Governor6 to the effect that the Railway Administration should be similarly debarred from recovering undercharges from the public unless the claim is made within 6 months. There was also a comment by the Manager of a Railway, that just as, by section 77, the public are debarred from obtaining a refund of an overcharge, unless the claim is preferred within 6 months from the date of delivery, the Railway Administration should also be debarred from recovering overcharges from public unless the claim is made within 6 months.7 These comments do not, however, seem to have carried much weight, and the clause was passed without substantial change on the points raised. We should, before we part with this Report, place on record our warm appreciation of the assistance we have received from Shri Bakshi, Member-Secretary of the Commission, in dealing with the problem covered by the Report. As usual, Shri Bakshi first prepared a draft which was treated as a Working Paper. The draft was considered by the Commission point by point, and, in the light of the decisions taken tentatively by the Commission, Shri Bakshi prepared a final draft for consideration which was after elaborate discussion approved by the Commission. Throughout the study of this problem, Shri Bakshi took an active part in our deliberations, and has rendered very valuable assistance to the Commission. 1. U.O. Reg. No. 3874 of 1882. 2. Information taken from the file relating to the Indian Railways Bill, Legislative papers relating to Act 9 of 1890, marginal note against clause 77 of the Bill (National Archives). 3. Government Advocate, Punjab, vide Government of India, Legislative Department Office Memorandum No. 387, dated 13-2-1880 (Cl. No. 1712 R.T.), referred to in the papers in the file relating to the Indian Railways Bill; Legislative Papers relating to Act 9 of 1890 (National Archives). 4. (a) Board of Directors, Bengal and North-Western Railway, Col. No. 687, dated 21-2-1889 (General No. 3701 R.T.); and (b) Agent and Chief Engineer Rehilkhand and Human Railway, Col. No. 274, dated 27-10-1888 (Cl. No. 4359 R.T.), and (c) Agent, D.N.R., vide Consulting Engineer, Lucknow No. 2270, dated 9-12-1888 (Cl. No. 14720 R.T.). 5. Information taken from the file relating to the Indian Railway Bill; Legislative Papers relating to Act 9 of 1890 (National Archives) 6. Lieutenant Governor, Government of Bengal No. 26442, dated 27-11-1889 (Cl. No. 11846 R.T.). Information taken from file relating to the Indian Railways Bill, Legislative Papers relating to Act 9 of 1990 (National Archives). 7. Information taken from the file, relating to the Indian Railways Bill, Legislative papers relating to Act 9 of 1890 (National Archives). P.B. Gajendragadkar, Chairman. V.R. Krishna Iyer, Member. P.K. Tripathi, Member. S.S. Dhavan, Member. S.P. Sen-Varma, Member. P.M. Bakshi, Chairman. Member-Secretary. New Delhi, Dated: 7th May, 1973.