Law Commission of India Report No. 275
Legal Framework: BCCI vis-a-vis Right to Information Act, 2005
Forwarded to the Union Minister of Law and Justice, Ministry of Law and Justice, Government of India by Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan Law Commission of India, on 18 April 2018
Dr. Justice B.S. Chauhan
1. Whether BCCI would qualify to be a 'public authority' so as to fall under the purview of the RTI Act?
2. What would be the ambit of the terms 'substantially financed; and 'directly or indirectly' financed/funded mentioned in section 2(h)(d)(ii) of the RTI Act?
3. Whether tax exemptions of the tune of thousands of crores and provision of land at highly discounted rates/nominal value, by the Central and State Government, for the construction of cricket stadiums, amount to indirect 'substantial financing' by the Government?The answer to these questions were explored perusing parliamentary debates, case-law precedents, commentaries of eminent jurists and other aids of interpretation and eminent jurists and other aids of interpretation and construction. To put things in the right perspective, the Commission further delved into a brief history of the game of cricket, the BCCI, and the need and consequent evolution of the RTI Act. A study of foreign jurisdictions in the context of right to information was also undertaken. The Commission held consultations with various experts and stakeholders, including the Central Information Commission, on the subject. However, BCCI, despite the service of notice and reminder thereon, did not respond/participate. The Commission acknowledges the excellent assistance provided nu Shri Setu Gupta, Dr. Saumya Saxena and Ms. Oshin Belove in preparation of this Report. With warm regards,
Hon'ble Minister for Law and Justice
Ministry of Law and Justice
Government of India
New Delhi - 110 015
Legal Framework: BCCI vis-a-vis Right to Information Act, 2005
Chapter - I
BackgroundA. A Brief History of Cricket in India 1.1 As per the records, the game of cricket was first played in India as early as in1721. The first club, i.e., the Calcutta Cricket Club, was established in 1792, on the site where Eden Gardens now stands, although its membership was restricted to Europeans only. Five years later, Bombay hosted the first match, wherein Indians commenced playing the game. At the end of the 18th century the Parsees took on the Eton Ramblers Cricket Club, and later in 1848, they formed the Orient Club.1
• Arrange and control inter-territorial, foreign and other cricket matches.
• Make arrangements incidental to visits of teams to India, and to manage and control all-India representatives playing within and outside India.
• If necessary, to control and arrange all or any inter-territorial disputes.
• To settle disputes or differences between Associations affiliated to the Board and appeals referred to it by any such Associations.
• To adopt if desirable, all rules or amendments passed by the Marylebone Cricket Club.1.9 Subsequently, in December of 1927, in a meeting at the Bombay Gymkhana, a unanimous decision was taken to form a 'Provisional' Board of Control to represent cricket in India. The plan was for this 'Provisional' Board to cease to function as soon as the eight territorial cricket associations were created; and, that the representatives of the eight associations would then come together to constitute the Board. 1.10 However, by late 1928, only six associations - Southern Punjab Cricket Association, Cricket Association of Bengal, Assam Cricket Association, Madras Cricket Association and Northern India Cricket Association - had been formed.8
A popular Government, without popular information or the means for obtaining it, is but a Prologue to Farce or Tragedy or perhaps both. Knowledge will for ever govern ignorance and a people who meant to be their own governors must arm themselves with the power knowledge gives.1.14 This quote demonstrates exactly how crucial it is for the populace to be armed with tool of knowledge if they desire to be self-governed. The Supreme Court gave recognition to the citizen's right to information as part of the right to freedom of speech and expression under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution of India. This in-turn meant that right to information was subject to reasonable restrictions enunciated in Article 19(2) of the Constitution viz sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with Foreign States, public order, decency or morality, contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence. The Constitutional jurisprudence that led to the recognition of this right, is traced to the following catena of cases. 1.15 In the case of Bennet Coleman& Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106. the Apex Court remarked:
It is indisputable that by freedom of the press meant the right of all citizens to speak, publish and express their views' and `freedom of speech and expression' includes within its compass the right of all citizens to read and be informed.1.16 In the case of State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 865. the respondent had asked for the documents pertaining to the security arrangements and the expenses incurred on the then Prime Minister. The Supreme Court while maintaining a fine balance between public security and public interest observed that while there are strong arguments for the former, the Executive cannot be given exclusive power to determine what matters may prejudice the latter. Once considerations of national security are concluded there are few matters that cannot be safely made publicly available. Justice K.K. Mathew, observed:
In a government of responsibility like ours, where all the agents of the public must be responsible for their conduct, there can be but few secrets. The people of this country have a right to know every public act, everything that is done in a public way, by their public functionaries ...........1.17 In the case of S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. Justice Bhagwati, observed that an open Government directly emanates from the right to know which is implicit in the right of free speech and expression. Therefore, the disclosure of information in regard to the functioning of the Government must be the rule and secrecy an exception. 1.18 In the case of Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India & Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal & Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1236. the Apex Court held that:
The freedom of speech and expression includes the right to acquire information and to disseminate it. Freedom of speech and expression is necessary for self-fulfilment. It enables people to contribute to debate on social and moral issues. It is the best way to find a truest model of anything, since it is only through it that the widest possible range of ideas can circulate. It is the only vehicle of political discourse so essential to democracy....the right to freedom of speech and expression also includes the right to educate, to inform and to entertain and also the right to be educated, informed and entertained...True democracy cannot exist unless all citizens have a right to participate in the affairs of the polity of the country. The right to participate in the affairs of the country is meaningless unless the citizens are well informed on all sides of the issues...One sided information, disinformation, misinformation and non-information all equally create an uninformed citizenry which makes democracy a farce when medium of information is monopolised either by a partisan central authority or by private individuals or oligarchic organisations .........1.19 In the case of Dinesh Trivedi, MP & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 306. while dealing with the Vohra Committee Report on the criminalisation of politics and of the nexus among criminals, politicians and bureaucrats in India, the Supreme Court observed:
In modern Constitutional democracies, it is axiomatic that citizens have a right to know about the affairs of the Government which, having been elected by them, seeks to formulate sound policies of governance aimed at their welfare. However, like all other rights, even this right has recognized limitations; it is, by no means, absolute.1.20 The Court further stated that, though it is not advisable to make public the basis on which certain conclusions are arrived at in that report, the conclusion so reached, should be examined by a new body of institution. The Court added that, it is now recognised that while a public servant may be subject to a duty of confidentiality, this duty does not extend to remaining silent regarding corruption of other public servants. Society is entitled to know and public interest is better served if corruption or maladministration is exposed.15
In pursuance of this supreme objective Article 19(1)(a) guarantees to the citizens, the right to "freedom of speech and expression" as one of the fundamental rights listed in Part III of the Constitution. These rights have been advisedly set out in broad terms leaving scope for expansion and adaptation, through interpretation, to the changing needs and evolving notions of a free society.1.23 The Court added that right to information is a facet of "freedom of speech and expression" as contained in Article 19(1)(a) and is thus indisputably a fundamental right. 1.24 A reading of these cases, among others, makes it clear that right to information is indisputably a corollary of freedom of speech and expression, and thereby a fundamental right guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution of India. Moreover, it is apparent that right to information has become an imperative in a democratic set-up such as that of India. (a) Right to Information Laws in States 1.25 Prior to the `right to information' debate at the national stage, there were several States which had proactively enacted their respective `right to information' laws. Some of these State-made laws have been repealed by the State Governments in favour of the Central Act, while others continue to co-exist with the Central RTI Act, with supplemental rules regarding fees, appeals and other procedural requirements. Some of the prominent State made RTI laws are discussed below: (1) Tamil Nadu 1.26 Tamil Nadu was the first Indian State to enact its own right to information law in the form of Tamil Nadu Right to Information Act, 1997. Section 2(3) of the Act defines information as:
`Information' includes copy of any document relating to the affairs of the State or any local or other authorities constituted under any [A]ct for the time being in force or a statutory authority or a company, corporation or a co-operative society or any organisation owned or controlled by the Government.1.27 It should be noted that this is an inclusive definition. The definition makes no mention of `funding' provided by the Government, `substantial' or otherwise. The Act does not provide for a judicial forum for hearing appeals and lays down that appeal can be made to the Government or such other authority as may be notified by the Government.18 It contains twenty-one categories of information that are excluded from the purview of the Act, seriously dampening its effect. There is no provision providing for offences or penalty. The State Act runs concurrently with the Central Act. The State Government has constituted a State Information Commission and prescribed Rules for accessing information under the RTI Act 2005.
any material or information relating to the affairs of the State or any local or other authorities constituted under any enactment passed by the Legislative Assembly of Goa for the time being in force or a Statutory Authority or a Company, Corporation, Trust, Firm, Society or a Co-operative Society, or any Organisation funded or controlled by the Government or executing any public work or service on behalf of or as authorised by the Government.[emphasis added].1.30 It should be noted that the Act does not use the word `substantially' before the word funded. Additionally, any entity executing public work or service on behalf of or on authorisation of the Government would be liable to provide information under the Act. The words `public work or service' as well as `authorised by the Government' are not defined and are consequently, open to interpretation. 1.31 Section 2(d) defines the `Right to Information' while section 3 guarantees this right.19 Section 5 of this Act provides for a few categories of information excluded from the purview of right to information viz matters relating to sovereignty and integrity of India or security of State, trade and commercial secrets, personal information etc. Reasons for denial of information are to be recorded in writing. Section 6 of the Act further provides that if any person is aggrieved by an order of the Competent Authority as to the refusal of any information, they can appeal to the Administrative Tribunal, constituted under the Goa Administrative Tribunal Act.
(a) offices of all local bodies and other authorities constituted under any enactment of the Rajasthan State Legislature for the time being in force; or
(b) any other statutory authority constituted by the State Government under any law for the time being in force; or
(c) a Government Company/ corporation incorporated under the Companies Act 1956 (Central Act No. 1 of 1956) in which not less than fifty-one percent of the paid-up share capital is held by the State Government or a trust established by the State Government under any law for the time being in force and controlled by it; or
(d) a Society or a Co-operative Society or any other organisation established under any law for the time-being in force, by the State Government and directly controlled or funded by it[emphasis added]; or
(e) any other body, which may be receiving substantial financial assistance from the State Government, as may be specified by notification in the Official Gazette for the purposes of this Act [emphasis added];1.39 It should be noted here that this Act, even though predating the Central Act by five years, talks about the financial linkage of a body or entity with the Government. Meaning thereby, that if a body or entity is connected in such a manner, it would be deemed to be a public body. 1.40 Section 5 of the Act provides for ten categories of information, which are not covered under the `right' to information guaranteed in section 3 of the Act. Sections 6 and 7 deal with appeals. Under these sections one internal appeal and one appeal to an independent body are provided for. 1.41 Section 12-A of the Act deals with suo moto disclosure of the information by the State Government and public bodies as it may consider appropriate in public interest. 1.42 Here too, the State Act runs concurrently with the Central Act. (5) Karnataka 1.43 Karnataka Right to Information Act, 2000 (now repealed) received the assent of the Governor on the December 10, 2000. Section 2(b) of this Act defined "information" to mean information relating to any matter in respect of the affairs of the administration or decisions of a public authority. Section 4(2) of the Act contained eight sub-clauses dealing with exemptions from disclosable category of information. This Act also contained a penalty clause and provided for an appeal to an independent tribunal. 1.44 This Act was repealed on October 17, 2005 by an Ordinance. The State Government is implementing the RTI Act 2005. The Government has also issued the Karnataka Right to Information Rules 2005 modelled on the Central Government's Rules. (6) Maharashtra 1.45 The Maharashtra Right to Information Act, 2000 (repealed by Right to Information Ordinance, 2002) had only nine sections. Section 3(2) of the said Act provided for twenty-two categories of information not required to be disclosed in line with the Tamil Nadu Act.22 Section 2(3) of the Act defined `information' to include "a copy of any document relating to the affairs of the State or any local or other authorities constituted under any Act for the time being in force or a statutory authority or a company, corporation or a co-operative society or any organization, owned or controlled by the Government."
"any material or information relating to the affairs of the National Capital Territory of Delhi except matters with respect to entries 1,2 and 18 of the State List and entries 64, 65 and 66 of that list in so far as they relate to the said entries 1,2 and 18 embodied in the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution."1.50 Section 2(7) defines `public authority' as
"any authority or body established or constituted (a) by or under the Constitution, (b) by any law made by the Government and includes any other body owned, controlled or substantially financed by funds provided directly or indirectly by the Government[emphasis added]."1.51 Section 6 of the Act contains standard exclusions from disclosable category of information and provides for a procedure for filing of appeals, under section 7. 1.52 The Act runs concurrently with the Central RTI Act. (8) Uttar Pradesh 1.53 Uttar Pradesh Government issued Executive Orders establishing a `Code of Practice on Access to Information' on April 3, 2000. However, after the passing of the Central RTI Act, the State Government started implementing the Central Act. The State Government then issued the Uttar Pradesh Right to Information (Regulation of Fees and Costs) Rules, 2006, and the Uttar Pradesh State Information Commission (Appeal Procedure) Rules, 2006; but in 2016,both these rules were superseded and replaced by the Uttar Pradesh Right to Information Rules, 2015. (9) Jammu and Kashmir 1.54 In Jammu and Kashmir, the Jammu and Kashmir Right to Information Act, 2003 (notified in the Government Gazette on 7 January 2004), was replaced by the Jammu and Kashmir Right to Information Act, 2009, which received the Governor's assent on March 20, 2009.The State Government also published the Jammu and Kashmir Right to Information Rules, 2009 on July 20, 2009. 1.55 Due to the special constitutional status of the State, the Central Act is not applicable here, however, the definitions of the terms "information"24 and "public authority"25 are akin to the Central Act.
Public Authority means and includes the officer of-
(i) all local bodies and other authorities constituted by the State Government under any law for the time being in force; or
(ii) a Government Company or corporation incorporated under the Companies Act 1956 in which not less than fifty one percent of the paid up share capital is held by the State Government, or other State Government undertakings, organizations or institutions financed either wholly or partly and owned, or controlled by the State Government or any other company, corporation, undertaking or institution in which the State Government stands guarantor in respect of any loan or financial advance availed of by such company corporation, institution, organization or undertaking, as the case may be; or
(iii) a co-operative society or any other society, a trust or any other organization or institution established under any law for the time being in force by the State Government and directly controlled or funded by it; or
(iv) any body, authority, institution, organization, agency or instrumentally including the District Rural Development Agencies, funded either wholly or partly by the State Government; and,
(v) any other body, authority institution or organization receiving substantial financial assistance from the State Government as may be notified by the State Government from time to time for the purposes of this Act;1.58 Certain exceptions to `Public Authority' are also provided in the aforesaid definition.26 The State Act runs concurrently with the Central Act, and soon after the passing of the Central Act, the State Government started implementing the latter as well. The State Government issued Assam Right to Information Fee Rules, 2005 in the exercise of powers conferred by the Central Act.
Reference to Commission and Reports of Various Committees2.1 The Supreme Court, in the Cricket Association of Bihar case, made reference to the Law Commission of India to examine the issue of bringing BCCI under the purview of the RTI Act, 2005 and make pertinent recommendations to the Government. 2.2 It is trite that the right to information has been considered as a sine qua non to the right to freedom of speech and expression guaranteed under Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution. There have been quite a few Commissions and Committees that have made valuable suggestions with regard to a better translation of this right within the framework of the Constitution itself as well as in independent statutes. 2.3 In this regard, the Report of National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution, 2002 (NCRWC) merits foremost attention. A. NCRWC Report, 200232
Art. 19(1) All citizens shall have the right -
(a) to freedom of speech and expression which shall include the freedom of the press and other media, the freedom to hold opinions and to seek, receive and impart information and ideas.
19(2) Nothing in sub-clause (a) of clause (1) shall affect the operation of any existing law, or prevent the State from making any law, in so far as such law imposes reasonable restrictions on the exercise of the right conferred by the said sub-clause in the interests of the sovereignty and integrity of India, the security of the State, friendly relations with foreign States, public order, decency or morality, or in relation to contempt of court, defamation or incitement to an offence, or preventing the disclosure of information received in confidence except when required in public interest.2.8 As can be observed, the NCRWC advised to include within the scope of other authorities - any person in relation to such of its functions which are of a public nature, thus expanding the ambit of application of Article 19(1)(a), and simultaneously making the right to information enforceable against such bodies whose functions are in the nature of public functions. B. 179th Report of the Law Commission of India, 200133
• The Legislature must "seriously consider" bringing BCCI under the purview of the RTI Act.
• There should be a Steering Committee headed by former Home Secretary G.K. Pillai with former national cricketers, Mohinder Amarnath, Diana Eduljiand Anil Kumble as members.
• The term of an office bearer of BCCI shall not be of more than 3 years.
• An office bearer can have a maximum of three terms in all.
• No office bearer shall have consecutive terms. There shall be a cooling-off period at the end of each term.
• There should be a separate governing body for the IPL.
• Players and BCCI officials should disclose their assets to the Board as a measure to ensure they do not bet.
• In the interest of democratic representations of states, it proposed `One State - One Member - One Vote'. Also, no proxy voting of individuals should be permitted.
• No BCCI office-bearer should be Minister or government servant.2.18 The Lodha Committee was aware that its recommendations would most likely invoke varied responses from stakeholders, but it believed that, with the Supreme Court of India feeling need to step-in to restore the game of cricket in India to its pristine glory, stern steps recommended by the Committee were inevitable. 2.19 Thus, it can be seen that the issues revolving around the right to information, lack of transparency and accountability within various sectors of public importance, have been discussed time and again. The legal status of the bodies representing these sectors has been a moot question. Consequently, invoking the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and the High Courts, in the matter concerning actions of these bodies or inactions thereof, has become the order of the day.
Concept of State Under Article 12 of the Constitution3.1 Article 12 of the Constitution of India over the decades, been the subject matter of great interpretational exercise. There have been many deliberations on the scope and extent of the term `State' defined in this Article. 3.2 The Article reads as follows:
In this [P]art, unless the context otherwise requires, `the State' includes the Government and the Parliament of India and the Government and the Legislature of each of the States and all local or other authorities within the territory of India or under the control of the Government of India.3.3 This definition was initially considered as exhaustive and limited to authorities stipulated under this Article and those that could be read ejusdem generis. Till the year 1967, the Courts had taken the view that even statutory bodies, Universities, Selection Committees for admissions to Government Colleges were not "other authorities" for the purpose of this Article. 3.4 However, this position changed when a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court in Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857.(Rajasthan State Electricity Board case) interpreted the term `other authorities' to include all Constitutional and Statutory bodies on whom powers were conferred by law and it was held that it is not at all material that some of the powers conferred were for the purpose of carrying on activities that were commercial in nature. 3.5 Even after this new, expanded scope of the term `other authorities', in 1969, the Apex Court once again examining the said term, pronounced that a company incorporated under the Companies Act was outside the purview of `State' as it was not formed statutorily and was not subject to discharge any statutory duty.37
The concept of State has undergone drastic changes in recent years. Today State cannot be conceived of simply as a coercive machinery wielding the thunderbolt of authority. It has to be viewed mainly as a service corporation...A State is an abstract entity. It can only act through the instrumentality or agency of natural or juridical persons. Therefore, there is nothing strange in the notion of the state acting through a corporation and making it an agency or instrumentality of the State...The governing power wherever located must be subject to the fundamental Constitutional limitations. The need to subject the power centers to the control of Constitution require an expansion of the concept of State action...the ultimate question which is relevant for our purpose is whether such a corporation is an agency or instrumentality of the government for carrying on a business for the benefit of the public. In other words, the question is, for whose benefit was the corporation carrying on the business?3.7 A special mention is required to be made of the case of Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1329.(Sabhajit Tewary case), decided on the same day as the Sukhdev Singh case, where the Apex Court took a contrary view holding that the Council of Scientific and Industrial Research (CSIR) was not `other authority' for the following reasons - (a) that it did not have a statutory character like ONGC, LIC or IFC but was merely a society incorporated in accordance with the provisions of Societies Registration Act; and (b) that the employees of CSIR did not enjoy the protection available to government servants as contemplated under Article 311 of the Constitution. 3.8 Later in 1978, in the case of Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548. while dealing with the terms `regal' and `sovereign' functions, the Supreme Court held that such terms are used to define the term `governmental' functions, despite the fact that there are difficulties that arise while giving such a meaning to the said terms, for the reason that the government has entered the field of industry. Thus, only such services should be excluded from the sphere of industry, by necessary implication, which are governed by separate rules and Constitutional provisions such as Articles 310 and 311. 3.9 Thereafter in the landmark decision of Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628. See also, K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1985 SC 660.(International Airports Authority case) the Supreme Court held as under:
A corporation may be created in one of two ways. It may be either established by statute or incorporated under a law such as the Companies Act 1956 or the Societies Registration Act 1860. Where a Corporation is wholly controlled by Government not only in its policy making but also in carrying out the functions entrusted to it by the law establishing it or by the Charter of its incorporation, there can be no doubt that it would be an instrumentality or agency of Government. But ordinarily where a corporation is established by statute, it is autonomous in its working, subject only to a provision, often times made, that it shall be bound by any directions that may be issued from time to time by Government in respect of policy matter. So also a corporation incorporated under law is managed by a board of directors or committee of management in accordance with the provisions of the statute under which it is incorporated. When does such a corporation become an instrumentality or agency of Government? Is the holding of the entire share capital of the Corporation by Government enough or is it necessary that in addition, there should be a certain amount of direct control exercised by Government and, if so, what should be the nature of such control? Should the functions which the corporation is charged to carry out possess any particular characteristic or feature, or is the nature or the functions immaterial? Now, one thing is clear that if the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government. But, as is quite often the case, a corporation established by statute may have no shares or shareholders, in which case it would be a relevant factor to consider whether the administration is in the hands of a board of directors appointed by Government, though this consideration also may not be determinative, because even while the directors are appointed by Government, they may be completely free from governmental control in the discharge of their functions. What then are the tests to determine whether a corporation established by statute or incorporated under law is an instrumentality or agency of Government? It is not possible to formulate an all-inclusive or exhaustive test which would adequately answer this question 'there is no cut and dried formula, which would provide the correct division of corporations into those which are instrumentalities or agencies of Government and those which are not.3.10 In the case of Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487. (Ajay Hasia case) where a Regional Engineering College whose administration was carried on by a society registered under the Societies Act 1898, question arose as to whether it could fall under the definition of `State' and thus be amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32. It was held by the Court that a society is not on the same footing as the Government of India or the Government of any State, so what remains to be seen is whether it would fall under the ambit of `other authorities'. The Court emphasised that the concept of agency or instrumentality of the Government is not limited to a corporation created by a statute but is equally applicable to a company or a society and in each individual case it would have to be decided, on a consideration of relevant factors. The Court laid down the relevant tests to determine the existence of State agency or instrumentality, relying on the International Airport Authority case, summarised as follows:
1. If the entire share capital of the corporation is held by Government, it would go a long way towards indicating that the corporation is an instrumentality or agency of Government.
2. Where the financial assistance of the State is so much as to meet almost entire expenditure of the corporation, it would afford some indication of the corporation being impregnated with governmental character.
3. Whether the corporation enjoys a monopoly status which is State conferred or State protected.
4. Whether the State has a `deep and pervasive' control over it.
5. If the functions of the entity are of public importance and closely related to governmental functions.
6. If a department of Government itself is transferred to a corporation.3.11 The Court added that these tests were not conclusive or clinching but they were merely indicative indicia which have to be used with care and caution, while stressing the necessity of a wide meaning to be placed on the expression `other authorities'. 3.12 In Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111. See also, General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd., Sultanpur, Uttar Pradesh v. Satrughan Nishad, (2003) 8 SCC 639; Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, AIR 2003 SC 4325; G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute, AIR 2003 SC 1764.(Pradeep Kumar Biswas case) the majority view had been that the tests laid down in Ajay Hasia case were not rigid set of principles so that a body falling within one of them must be considered to be `State'. The question in each case would be whether on facts the body is financially, functionally, and administratively dominated by, or under the control of the Government. Additionally, such control must be pervasive. Mere regulatory control, whether statutory or otherwise is not sufficient. If these conditions are met, then a body can be called `State'. In this case the decision rendered in Sabhajit Tewary case was overruled and it was held by the majority that CSIR was `State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution.
RTI Laws & Sports Bodies: Human Rights Perspective4.1 Globally, sports have influenced different aspects of human life ranging from physical and mental well-being, professional employment, interpersonal relationship development, acting as a social bridge between diverse races and communities to even acting as an arrow in the quiver of statecraft. The relation between human existence and sports is uniquely intricate; and, what, therefore, inevitably ensues, is the interplay of sports with human rights. 4.2 The dicta of human rights, being universal in its application, cannot be discounted by sporting organisations. Restrictions on the free flow of information erodes the cardinal democratic values enshrined in the Constitution of India. Denial of information aids the abuse of power by selected segments of the society by excluding the masses politically, socially and economically. The concept of human development is directly linked to human rights. A rights-based approach demands participation in governance and development, which guaranteed access to information can provide.44
The right to seek and receive information is not simply a converse of the right to freedom of opinion and expression but a freedom on its own...the right to seek, receive and impart information imposes a positive obligation on States to ensure access to information, particularly with regard to information held by the Government in all types of storage and retrieval systems...4.15 In 2013, the Report of Special Rapporteur, gave a full rationale for a robust right to information:
...Public authorities act as representatives of the public, fulfilling a public good; therefore, in principle, their decisions and actions should be transparent. A culture of secrecy is acceptable only in very exceptional cases, when confidentiality may be essential for the effectiveness of their work. There is consequently a strong public interest in the disclosure of some types of information. Moreover, access to certain types of information can affect the enjoyment by individuals of other rights. In such cases, information can be withheld only in very exceptional circumstances, if at all.54
...However, the positive obligations on States Parties to ensure Covenant rights will only be fully discharged if individuals are protected by the State, not just against violations of Covenant rights by its agents, but also against acts committed by private persons or entities that would impair the enjoyment of Covenant rights in so far as they are amenable to application between private persons or entities...66
1. A policy commitment to meet their responsibility to respect human rights;
2. A human rights due diligence process to identify, prevent, mitigate and account for how they address their impacts on human rights;
3. Processes to enable the remediation of any adverse human rights impacts they cause or to which they contribute.4.29 In the course of Parliamentary debate on the passage of the Human Rights Act of the United Kingdom, it was clear that private bodies delivering privatised or subcontracted public services were meant to be included within the scope of the Act through the "public function" concept.72 These private individuals and bodies are in a position to breach human rights guarantees and, therefore, should be subject to the same legal constraints as if they were a public entity exercising the power.73
Insofar as obligation to fulfil these rights are concerned, the same is not limited to the Government or government agencies/State but even the private entities (which shall include private carriers as well) are fastened with such an obligation which they are supposed to carry out. We have also mentioned that in the year 2000, Respondent No. 2, i.e. DGCA (Directorate General Civil Aviation) had issued CAR (Civil Aviation Requirements) with regard to `carriage' by persons with disabilities and/or persons with reduced mobility.4.31 It is not only the Government agencies which are obligated to respect these rights, but private bodies acting as Government agents or to which public functions are delegated or subcontracted should also be held accountable similarly.75
• Violence and Discrimination
• Human Trafficking
• Forced Labour
• Child Labour
• Corruption4.33 The observance of human rights is dependent on a democratic society. Human rights may be inherent, but for them to be enabled, people ought to be empowered with information and knowledge so that they can scrutinize the functioning of the authorities to check human rights violations. People need to be capable of participating in the governance of their community. This cannot be done in a meaningful manner unless the RTI law, as a tool, gives the entitlement and mechanism to obtain information. 4.34 Institute for Human Rights and Business's (IHRB) Report titled "Striving for Excellence: Mega Sporting Events and Human Rights" included a series of recommendations for sports governing bodies and other key stakeholders involved in preparing and staging a Mega Sports Event. These recommendations are intended to support efforts made by sports governing bodies to ensure that human rights are more central to the way they do business in the years ahead.77
The adverse impact of lack of probity in public life leading to a high degree of corruption is manifold. It also has adverse effect on foreign investment and funding from the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank who have warned that future aid to underdeveloped countries may be subject to the requisite steps being taken to eradicate corruption, which prevents international aid from reaching those for whom it is meant. Increasing corruption has led to investigative journalism which is of value to a free society. The need to highlight corruption in public life through the medium of public interest litigation invoking judicial review may be frequent in India but is not unknown in other countries.4.40 The Apex Court in the aforementioned case added that, "it cannot be doubted that there is a serious human rights aspect involved in a proceeding regarding corruption", as the prevailing corruption in public life, if allowed to continue unimpeded, will ultimately erode Indian polity. 4.41 Likewise, in the case of State of Maharashtra, through CBI, Anti-Corruption Branch, Mumbai v. Balakrishna Dattatrya Kumbhar, (2012) 12 SCC 384 : (2013) 2 SCC (Cri) 784 : (2013) 2 SCC (L&S) 201. the Apex Court held that, "Corruption is not only a punishable offence but also undermines human rights, indirectly violating them, and systematic corruption, is a human rights violation in itself, as it leads to systematic economic crimes." 4.42 The negative effect of corruption on human rights was further highlighted by the Supreme Court in the case of, Subramanian Swamy v. Manmohan Singh & Anr., (2012) 3 SCC 64 : (2012) 1 SCC (Cri) 1041 : (2012) 2 SCC (L&S) 666. wherein it was observed that, corruption, not only, poses severe danger to the concept of constitutional governance, but also to the Rule of Law, and the very foundation of democracy in India. The court added that it is undisputable that with the beginning of corruption, all rights are automatically extinguished and that the phenomena of corruption "devalues human rights, chokes development and undermines justice, liberty, equality, fraternity, which are the core values of Preambular vision". In another case, Subramanian Swamy v. Director, Central Bureau of Investigation and Anr., (2014) 8 SCC 682. the Apex Court observed, that corruption is "an enemy of the nation". 4.43 The OHCHR has acknowledged the close link between human rights violations and corruption,83 stating that "There is an urgent need to increase synergy between inter-governmental efforts to implement the United Nations Convention against Corruption and international human rights conventions."
Bribery and corruption is not only about giving and taking money for private gain that has been intended for broader social purposes. It may also enable the parties involved to evade legal and contractual requirements, including those protecting human rights. Lack of financial integrity, therefore, is a foundational source of human rights risks.93
Perusal of the Terms `public Authority', `public Functions' and `substantially Financed'1. Public Authority a. National Perspective 5.1 To determine whether BCCI, under the existing legal framework, can be included within RTI Act, 2005, it is required to be ascertained whether BCCI can be termed as a `public authority' within the meaning assigned to the term under section 2(h) of the Act. 5.2 Section 2(h) defines the term `public authority' as:
`public authority' means any authority or body or institution of self- government established or constituted-
(a) by or under the Constitution;
(b) by any other law made by Parliament;
(c) by any other law made by State Legislature;
(d) by notification issued or order made by the appropriate Government, and includes[emphasis added] any-
(i) body owned, controlled[emphasis added] or substantially financed;
(ii) non-Government organization substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government; [emphasis added]
`Public authorities' include all bodies within the executive, legislative, and judicial branches at all levels of government, constitutional and statutory authorities, including security sector authorities; and non-state bodies that are owned or controlled by government or that serve as agents of the government. `Public authorities' also include private or other entities that perform public functions or services or operate with substantial public funds or benefits, but only in regard to the performance of those functions, provision of services, or use of public funds or benefits.5.10 On similar lines, the Human Rights Act, 1998 of the United Kingdom provides, ""Public Authority" includes.... any person certain of whose functions are functions of public nature."100
[w]hile technically a private and voluntary sporting association, the Rugby Union is in relation to this decision in a position of major national importance, for the reasons already outlined. In this particular case, therefore, we are not willing to apply to the question of standing the narrowest of criteria that might be drawn from private law fields. In truth the case has some analogy with public law issues. This is not to be pressed too far. We are not holding that nor even discussing whether, the decision is the exercise of a statutory power - although that was argued. We are saying simply that it falls into a special area where, in the New Zealand context, a sharp boundary between public and private law cannot realistically be drawn.5.12 In South Africa, determination of what a `public authority/power' is, can be seen in the observations made by the Court in the case of Chirwa v. Transnet Limited and Ors.,  ZACC 23.:
Determining whether a power or function is `public' is a notoriously difficult exercise. There is no simple definition or clear test to be applied. Instead, it is a question that has to be answered with regard to all the relevant factors including: (a) the relationship of coercion or power that the actor has in its capacity as a public institution; (b) the impact of the decision on the public; (c) the source of the power; and (d) whether there is a need for the decision to be exercised in the public interest. None of these factors will necessarily be determinative; instead, a court must exercise its discretion considering their relative weight in the context.5.13 Article 19, paragraph 2 of ICCPR embraces a right to access of information held by public bodies. Such information includes records held by a public body, regardless of the form in which the information is stored, its source and date of production. Designation of such bodies may also include other entities when such entities are carrying out public functions.103
If we look at the definition of Section 2(h), which has been extracted herein above, it is clear that the appellant company does not come under the provisions of Section 2(h)(a)(b)(c) or (d), but thereafter Section 2(h)(d) of the definition clause uses the word `includes'. It is well known that when the word `includes' is used in an interpretation clause, it is used to enlarge the meaning of the words and phrases occurring in the body of the statute...Therefore, obviously the definition of bodies referred to in Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the RTI Act would receive a liberal interpretation, and here the words which fall for interpretation are the words `controlled or substantially financed directly or indirectly by funds provided by the appropriate Government'.... The RTI Act is virtually enacted to give effect to citizen's right to know. Citizen's right to know has been construed by the Hon'ble Supreme Court as emanating from the citizen's right to freedom of speech and expression, which is a fundamental right. So, a legislation, which has been enacted to give effect to right to know, which is one of the basic human rights in today's world, must receive a purposive and broad interpretation.... The RTI Act has also provided a remedy for facilitating the exercise of the right to information and the reason for the remedy is also indicated in the Preamble to the Act. So going by the direction in Heydon's Case, followed by the Supreme Court in Bengal Immunity (supra) such an Act must receive a purposive interpretation to further the purpose of the Act. So any interpretation which frustrates the purpose of RTI Act must be eschewed. Following the said well known canon of construction, this Court interprets the expression "public authority" under Section 2(h)(d)(i) liberally, so that the authorities like the appellant who are controlled and substantially financed, directly or indirectly, by the government, come within the purview of the RTI Act. In coming to the conclusion, this Court reminds itself of the Preamble to the RTI Act which necessitates a construction which will hopefully cleanse our democratic polity of the corrosive effect of corruption and infuse transparency in its activities.5.22 Thus, it is evident from the above discussion that the word `includes' in section 2(h)(d) of the RTI Act, has to be given an illustrative and enumerative meaning and has to be bestowed a liberal interpretation, in line with the Preamble to the Act. d. Interpretation of the word `control' 5.23 The word `control', as a noun, has been defined in Black's Law Dictionary (8th edition) as, "the direct or indirect power to direct the management and policies of a person or entity, whether through ownership of voting securities, by contract, or otherwise; the power or authority to manage, direct, or oversee". As a verb, `control' has been defined as, "to exercise power or influence over', `to regulate or govern". 5.24 Merriam-Webster dictionary,113 defines `control' in the noun form as, "the power to make decisions about how something is managed or done; the ability to direct the actions of someone or something; an action, method, or law that limits the amount or growth of something." As a verb, `control' is defined as, "to direct the behaviour of (a person or animal); to cause (a person or animal) to do what you want; to have power over (something); to direct the actions or function of (something); to cause (something) to act or function in a certain way".
Article 226 confers wide powers on the High Courts to issue writs in the nature of prerogative writs. This is a striking departure from the English law. Under Article 226, writs can be issued to `any person or authority'. The term `authority' used in the context, must receive a liberal meaning unlike the term in Article 12 which is relevant only for the purpose of enforcement of fundamental rights under Article 32. Article 226 confers power on the High Courts to issue writs for enforcement of the fundamental rights as well as non-fundamental rights. The words `any person or authority' used in Article 226 are, therefore, not to be confined only to statutory authorities and instrumentalities of the State. They may cover any other person or body performing public duty. The form of the body concerned is not very much relevant[emphasis added]. What is relevant is the nature of the duty imposed on the body. The duty must be judged in the light of positive obligation owed by the person or authority to the affected party, no matter by what means the duty is imposed. If a positive obligation exists mandamus cannot be denied.b. International Perspective 5.40 Taking a look at foreign jurisdictions for a clearer understanding of the term `public function', we find that in the case of Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v. Donoghue,  Q.B. 48. the then Chief Justice Lord Woolf proposed a liberal interpretation of the term `public function'. He proposed that in order to make an otherwise private act a public one, there must be "a feature or a combination of features which impose a public character or stamp on the act." Such public characteristics may include statutory authority for the task carried out; the degree of control exercised by the public body over the exercise of the function; and how closely the acts in question are "enmeshed in the activities of the public body." 5.41 In the case of Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v. Wallbank,  1 A.C. 546. the House of Lords recognised the significance of using a "public function" analysis. Lord Nicholls concluded that there could be "no single test of universal application" in relation to the definition of `public function'. It was, however, added that the relevant factors for the claimants included the extent to which the function was being publicly funded, the exercise of statutory powers, there placing of Central Government or local authority in performing the function, or the rendering of a public service. 5.42 Therefore, it can be inferred that, contrary to popular belief, the terms `public authority' and `public function', can be effectively used in reference to private bodies, who by virtue of the nature of their functions, obtain a character typically assumed by the State. 3. Substantially Financed 5.43 A reading of the section 2(h) of the RTI Act establishes that a body owned, controlled or `substantially financed' as well as a non-Governmental Organisation `substantially financed', directly or indirectly, by the appropriate Government, is a `public authority', within the purview of the definition given in the said section. It, therefore, follows that if a body/entity is substantially financed by the appropriate Government, then even if it is not constituted under the Constitution of India or a Statute, and is a Non-Governmental Organisation/private body, it will be well within the ambit of the RTI Act, 2005. 5.44 To enrich this understanding, it is imperative to understand the meaning and scope of the term `substantially financed'. Since this term has not been defined by the Legislature in the RTI Act, other sources are required to be perused for according it a fruitful meaning. 5.45 From an economic standpoint, talking about Public-Private Partnerships (PPPs), the United Nations Economic and Social Commission in Asia and the Pacific (UNESCAP) mentions that land acquisition done by the Government on behalf of the private entity as well as tax incentives, can be classified as Government support measures.127
• direct support - in cash or in-kind (e.g. to defray construction costs, to procure land, to provide assets, to compensate for bid costs or to support major maintenance);
• waiving fees, costs and other payments which would otherwise have to be paid by the project company to a public-sector entity (e.g. authorising tax holidays or a waiver of tax liability);
• providing financing for the project in the form of loans (including mezzanine debt) or equity investment (or in the form of viability gap funding).5.47 In terms of waving fees and payments as an example of Government extending financial support, there are also instances of cricket association(s) within the bounds of a local body such as the Municipality, being extended the benefit of tax exemptions on otherwise leviable property taxes. 5.48 In the case of Palser v. Grimling, (1948) 1 All ER 1, 11 (HL). while interpreting the provisions of Section 10(1) of the Rent and Mortgage Interest Restrictions Act, 1923, the House of Lords held that "substantial" is not the same as "not unsubstantial", i.e., just enough to avoid the de minimis principle. The word "substantial" literally means solid, massive etc. 5.49 Etymologically speaking, in Black's Law Dictionary (6th edition), the word "substantial" is defined as "of real worth and importance; of considerable value; valuable. Belonging to substance; actually existing; real: not seeming or imaginary; not illusive; solid; true; veritable. Something worthwhile as distinguished from something without value or merely nominal. Synonymous with material." The word "substantially" has been defined to mean "essentially; without material qualification; in the main; in substance; materially." 5.50 Interestingly, in the Shorter Oxford English Dictionary (5th edition), the word "substantial" means "of ample or considerable amount of size; sizeable, fairly large; having solid worth or value, of real significance; sold; weighty; important, worthwhile; of an act, measure etc. having force or effect, effective, thorough." The word "substantially" has been defined to mean "in substance; as a substantial thing or being; essentially, intrinsically." Therefore, it can be said that the word "substantial" is not synonymous with "dominant" or "majority". It is closer to "material" or "important" or "of considerable value." "Substantially" is closer to "essentially". Both words can signify varying degrees depending on the context[emphasis added].130
Private bodies, especially where their activities affect the fundamental rights of the public, must be required to disclose information. In times of far reaching privatisation, institutions such as electricity boards and banks cannot be left out of law's scope.5.52 In the case of, The Hindu Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. The State Information Commission & Ors., ILR (2011) 2 P&H 64. (The Hindu Urban Cooperative Bank case), the Punjab & Haryana High Court observed that the word "substantial" has not been defined under RTI Act and has no limited or fixed meaning. For the purpose of legislation, it has to be construed in its ordinary and natural sense relatable to the aims, fundamental purpose and objects sought to be achieved to provide transparency to control corruption and to promote accountability under the RTI Act. 5.53 In the Thalappalam case, the Apex Court observed that the expression "substantially financed" in Sections 2(h)(d)(i) and (ii) indicate the degree of financing, which must be actual, existing, positive and real to a substantial extent, not moderate, ordinary, tolerable etc. The Court further stated that:
Merely providing subsidiaries, grants, exemptions, privileges etc., as such, cannot be said to be providing funding to a substantial extent, unless the record shows that the funding was so substantial to the body which practically runs by such funding and but for such funding, it would struggle to exist. The State may also float many schemes generally for the betterment and welfare of the cooperative sector like deposit guarantee scheme, scheme of assistance from NABARD etc., but those facilities or assistance cannot be termed as `substantially financed' by the State Government to bring the body within the fold of `public authority' Under Section 2(h)(d)(i) of the Act. But, there are instances, where private educational institutions getting ninety-five per cent grant-in-aid from the appropriate government, may answer the definition of public authority under Section 2(h)(d)(i).5.54 It was also observed that though the term `Non-Government Organisations' as such is not defined in the RTI Act, but over a period of time, it has acquired a meaning of its own and has to be seen in that context. If a Non-Government Organisation which though neither owned nor controlled by the State, receives substantial financing from the appropriate Government, it would also fall within the definition of `public authority' under section 2(h)(d)(ii) of RTI Act. 5.55 The Delhi High Court in the case of Indian Olympic Association v. Veerish Malik & Ors., ILR (2010) 4 Del 1. held that,
.... what amounts to `substantial' financing cannot be straight-jacketed into rigid formulae, of universal application. Of necessity, each case would have to be examined on its own facts. That the percentage of funding is not `majority' financing, or that the body is an impermanent one, are not material.
Equally, that the institution or organization is not controlled, and is autonomous ..... is irrelevant; indeed, the concept of non government organization means that it is independent of any manner of government control in its establishment, or management. That the organization does not perform or pre-dominantly performs `public' duties, too, may not be material, as long as the object for funding is achieving a felt need of a section of the public, or to secure larger societal goals. To the extent of such funding, indeed, the organization may be a tool, or vehicle for the executive government's policy fulfilment plan. This view, about coverage of the enactment, without any limitation, so long as there is public financing.5.56 In the case of Nagar Yuwak case, it was observed by the Bombay High Court that the term `substantially financed' has been repeatedly used by the Parliament with a view to eliminate, from the equation, such institutions which are financed directly or indirectly with a small or a little contribution of funds by the appropriate Government. 5.57 In the case of Population Services International v. Rajesh Dhiman, W.P.(C) 3422/2012: 2013 SCC OnLine Del 3659. the Delhi High Court, while deciding whether the petitioner organisation (PSI) would be `public authority' within the RTI Act, observed that, "if taken on absolute terms, a contribution ranging between Rs. 11 to 16 crores by the Government from its corpus of public funds cannot be considered as insignificant". Such a contribution would render PSI as being `substantially financed' by the Government. The Court further observed that, "...if over 1 crore or over 10% of the revenue funding comes from Government, directly or indirectly, it would certainly qualify as substantial funding." 5.58 In the case of Visvesvaraya Technological University v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, (2016) 12 SCC 258. the Apex Court placed reliance on the judgment of the High Court of Karnataka in the case of CIT v. Indian Institute of Management, (2014) 226 TAXMAN 301 (Kar) particularly on the view expressed that the expression "wholly or substantially financed by the Government" as appearing in section 10(23-C) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, cannot be confined to annual grants and must include the value of the land made available by the Government. The Apex Court further referred to the observations of the Karnataka High Court, which had held that, apart from annual grants the value of the land made available, the investment by the Government in the buildings and other infrastructure and the expenses incurred in running the institution must all be taken together while deciding whether the institution is wholly or substantially financed by the Government. 5.59 In the case of Krishak Bharti case, the Delhi High Court held that:
It is important to note that the word `financed' is qualified by the word `substantially' indicating a degree of financing. Therefore, it is not enough for such bodies to merely be financed by the government. They must be `substantially financed'. In simple terms, it must be shown that the financing of the body by the government is not insubstantial. The word `substantial' does not necessarily connote `majority' financing. In an annual budget of Rs. 10 crores, a sum of Rs. 20 lakhs may not constitute a dominant or majority financing but is certainly a substantial sum. An initial corpus of say Rs.10 lakhs for such an organization may be `substantial'. It will depend on the facts and circumstances of a case. Merely because percentage-wise the financing does not constitute a majority of the total finances of that entity will not mean that the financing is not `substantial'. A reference may be made to two different meanings of the word `substantial'.5.60 Further, in the case of CIT v. Parley Plastics Ltd., 322 ITR 63 (Bom.). the Bombay High Court held that the term "substantial" does not mean more than 50% and it can be 10% or 20%, depending on the other terms and conditions. If the legislature had any percentage more than 50% in mind, it would have been so provided for. 5.61 In the case of CIT v. Desia Vidyashala Samiti Shimoga, ITA No. 1133 of 2008, dated 02.08.2011. the Karnataka High Court, held that the Government grant to the extent of 34.33% amounts to substantial financing and consequently, exemption under section 10(23C)(iiiab) of the Income Tax Act, 1961, is allowable. 5.62 In the case of The Hindu Urban Cooperative Bank case, it was held by the Punjab & Haryana High Court that, in the larger context of public interest, the funds which the Government deal with, are public funds. They belong to the people. The Court added:
In that eventuality, wherever public funds are provided, the word `substantially financed' cannot possibly be interpreted in narrow and limited terms of mathematical, calculation and percentage (%). Wherever the public funds are provided, the word `substantial' has to be construed in contradistinction to the word `trivial' and where the funding is not trivial to be ignored as pittance, then to me, the same would amount to substantial funding coming from the public funds. Therefore, whatever benefit flows to the petitioner-institutions in the form of share capital contribution or subsidy, land or any other direct or indirect funding from different fiscal provisions for fee, duty, tax etc. as depicted hereinabove would amount to substantial finance by the funds provides directly or indirectly by the appropriate Government for the purpose of RTI Act in this behalf.5.63 In the case of Munish Kumar Seth v. Public Information Officer, 2012(3)RCR(Civil)660. it was observed by the Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission (PSCDRC), that the words, "substantially financed, directly or indirectly by funds provided by appropriate Government" are wide enough to bring within its sweep not only direct fund outflow from State exchequer, but also indirect monetary benefit which may have been facilitated by Governmental action. The PSCDRC added that, the word "funds" occurring in sub-clause (d) of Section 2 (h) have to be interpreted to include not only a direct cash outflow from Government to non- Government organization, but also indirect "funds" such as a financial concession or benefit or subsidy or remission of what was otherwise due to Government under any law or levy. Going by the dictionary meaning of the word "fund", it includes not only money received or collected but also money saved.[emphasis added] The 'Cambridge Dictionary online' defines the word fund as: a sum of money saved, collected or provided for a particular purpose; money needed or available to spend on something; a lot of something. Therefore, if a private organisation saves money by avoiding payment of what was otherwise due from it to Government under any law, rule or regulation, it would amount to a financial benefit to that organization. 5.64 In the case of Mother Dairy Fruit and Vegetable Private Limited v. Hatim Ali & Ors., AIR 2015 Delhi 132. the Delhi High Court held that it is relevant to note that the expression "substantially financed" is suffixed by the words "directly" or "indirectly". Thus, the finances indirectly provided by an appropriate Government would also have to be considered while determining whether a body has been substantially financed by an appropriate Government. The test to be applied is whether funds provided by the Central Government, directly or indirectly, are of material or considerable value to the body in question. 5.65 In the case of R.K. Jain & Ors. v. lndian Bank Association (lBA), Complaint Nos. CIC/MP/C/2015/000044 and CIC/SH/C/2016/000123. Decided On: 13-11-2017. the CIC referred to its earlier observations made in the case of Shikha Singh v. Tuberculosis Association of India, File No: CIC/AD/C/2010/001271dated 29/1/2011. as follows:
While considering the question of sub-stantiality of finance, the aspect of public interest cannot be overlooked because the funds, which the Government deal with, are public funds. They belong to the people. In that eventuality, wherever public funds are provided, the word `substantially financed' cannot possibly be interpreted in narrow and limited terms of mathematical, calculation and percentage). Wherever the public funds are provided, the word `substantial' has to be construed in contradistinction to the word `trivial' and where the funding is not trivial to be ignored as pittance, then to me, the same would amount to substantial funding coming from the public funds. Therefore, whatever benefit flows to the respondent organization in the form of any grant, donation, subsidy, land or any other direct or indirect funding would amount to substantial finance by the funds provided directly or indirectly by the appropriate Government for the purpose of RTI Act in this behalf.5.66 The CIC in this case held that 43% public sector resource, tax concessions, publicity funding, accommodation in twenty cities without rent makes the IBA totally dependent upon the Government and public-sector banks for survival and functioning.143
Analysis of the Legal Status of BCCI6.1 In light of the discussion in the foregoing chapters, the legal status of BCCI may now be examined. 6.2 The questions pertaining to the legal status of BCCI under Article 12 of the Constitution has arisen before the Delhi High Court in various cases viz Mohinder Amarnath & Ors. v. BCCI, CW.NO.632/89. Decided on 23-08-1989. (Mohinder Amarnath case), Ajay Jadeja v. Union of India & Ors., (2002) 95 DLT 14. (Ajay Jadeja case), and Rahul Mehra & Anr. v. Union of India, (2004) 78 DRJ 155 (DB). (Rahul Mehra case). 6.3 In Mohinder Amarnath case, BCCI was held not to be an instrumentality of State taking into consideration the contractual nature of the rights and duties. However, in the Ajay Jadeja case, the Court, dealing with the question of nature of the duties performed by BCCI and that of the rights infringed, held that a writ under Article 226 is maintainable given the public nature of activities undertaken by BCCI. The Court referred to the judgment in the case of Air India Statutory Corporation & Ors. v. United Labour Union & Ors., (1997) 9 SCC 377 : 1997 SCC (L&S) 1344. wherein the Supreme Court had emphasised on the public nature of the functions performed by a private body as necessary criterion for falling under Article 226. The Court also recognised that even if a matter arises from a contract purely under private law, a writ will lie if the contract gives rise to a public duty or if the action thereunder involves violation of fundamental rights. 6.4 In Rahul Mehra case, it was clarified that due to the withdrawal of the writ petition by Ajay Jadeja, the order passed thereof also stood vacated. However, it was affirmed that writ petition against BCCI is maintainable owing to the monopoly nature of the functions performed by BCCI in regulating and controlling the game of cricket. According to the Court the words "any person or authority" used in Article 226 may cover any other person or body performing public duty. 6.5 Certain observations of the Apex Court, in the case of Board of Control for Cricket, India & Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club & Ors., AIR 2005 SC 592 : (2005) 4 SCC 741. Paras 80-82. (Netaji Cricket Club case) pertinent to the current deliberation, are reproduced hereunder:
The Board is a society registered under the Tamil Nadu Societies Registration Act. It enjoys a monopoly status as regard regulation of the sport of cricket[emphasis added] in terms of its Memorandum of Association and Articles of Association. It controls the sport of cricket and lays down the law therefor. It inter alia enjoys benefits by way of tax exemption and right to use stadia at nominal annual rent. It earns a huge revenue not only by selling tickets to the viewers but also selling right to exhibit films live on TV and broadcasting the same[emphasis added]. Ordinarily, its full members are the State Associations except, Association of Indian Universities, Railway Sports Control Board and Services Sports Control Board. As a member of ICC, it represents the country in the international fora. It exercises enormous public functions. It has the authority to select players, umpires and officials to represent the country in the international fora. It exercises total control over the players, umpires and other officers[emphasis added]. The Rules of the Board clearly demonstrate that without its recognition no competitive cricket can be hosted either within or outside the country. Its control over the sport of competitive cricket is deep, pervasive and complete[emphasis added]. In law, there cannot be any dispute that having regard to the enormity of power exercised by it, the Board is bound to follow the doctrine of `fairness' and `good faith' in all its activities. Having regard to the fact that it has to fulfil the hopes and aspirations of millions, it has a duty to act reasonably. It cannot act arbitrarily, whimsically or capriciously. As the Board controls the profession of cricketers, its actions are required to be judged and viewed by higher standards...keeping in view the public good as also the welfare of the sport of cricket. It is, therefore, wholly undesirable that a body in-charge of controlling the sport of cricket should involve in litigations completely losing sight of the objectives of the society.Whether BCCI should be `State' within the meaning of Article 12? 6.6 In the case of Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677: (2005) 4 SCC 649. See also, A.C. Muthiah v. Board of Control for Cricket in India &Anr., (2011) 6 SCC 617. (Zee Telefilms case) the issue that arose before a Constitution Bench of the Supreme Court, was whether BCCI was `State' within Article 12 and consequently could a writ petition under Article 32 of the Constitution be maintainable against BCCI. The Court held:
It would be clear that the facts established do not cumulatively show that the Board is financially, functionally or administratively dominated by or is under the control of the Government. Thus, the little control that the Government may be said to have on the Board is not pervasive in nature. Such control is purely regulatory and nothing more.6.7 Referring to the case of Chander Mohan Khanna v. National Council of Educational Research and Training, AIR 1992 SC 76. and Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 212. the Court stated:
1. The Board is not created by a statute
2. No part of share capital of the Board is held by the Government.
3. Practically no financial assistance is given by the Government to meet the whole or entire expenditure of the Board.
4. The Board does enjoy a monopoly status in the field of cricket but such status is not State-conferred or State-protected.
5. There is no existence of a deep and pervasive State control. All functions of the Board are not public functions nor are they closely related to governmental functions.
6. The Board is not created by the transfer of a government-owned corporation. It is an autonomous body.6.8 BCCI, was, therefore, held not to be `State' under Article 12 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court sounded a note of caution in this case that the situation prevailing in the Rajasthan State Electricity case and Sukhdev Singh case, was no longer prevalent as in the meantime the socio-economic policy of the Government of India had changed, and hence there was no need to further expand the scope of `other authorities' under Article 12 by judicial interpretation. Minority View in Zee Telefilms Case 6.9 The minority view in the Zee Telefilms case was expressed by Justice Sinha on behalf of Justice S.N. Variava and himself; and the same deserves a special mention here. It was said that our Constitution is an ongoing document and thus requires a liberal interpretation and therefore the interpretation of Article 12 with regard to the exclusive control and management of the game of cricket by the Board and the enormous power exercised by it, called for a new approach.156
Broadly, there are three different concepts which exist for determining the questions which fall within the expression `other authorities':
(i) The corporations and the societies created by the State for carrying on its trading activities in terms of Article 298 of the Constitution where for the capital, infrastructure, initial investment and financial aid, etc. are provided by the State and it also exercises regulation and control there over.
(ii) Bodies created for research and other developmental works which are otherwise governmental functions but may or may not be a part of the sovereign function.
(iii) A private body is allowed to discharge public duty or positive obligation of public nature and furthermore is allowed to perform regulatory and controlling functions and activities which were otherwise the job of the Government.158
(i) When the body acts as a public authority and has a public duty to perform.
(ii) When it is bound to protect human rights.
(iii) When it regulates a profession or vocation of a citizen which is otherwise a fundamental right under a statute or its own rule.
(iv) When it regulates the right of a citizen contained in Article 19(1)(a) of the Constitution available to the general public and viewers of the game of cricket in particular.
(v) When it exercises a de facto or a de jure monopoly.
(vi) When the State outsources its legislative power in its favour.
(vii) When it has a positive obligation of public nature.6.14 Continuing thereon, it was said that the traditional tests of control - financial, functional and administrative, by the Government as laid down in Pradeep Kumar Biswas case would apply only when a body is created by the State itself for different purposes but incorporated under the Companies Act or registered under the Societies Registration Act. Those tests may not be applicable in a case like that of BCCI, where it was established as a private body many years ago. Being allowed by the State to represent the country at the international stage it became an archetypal body for Indian cricket. The magnanimity and enormity of the functions of BCCI provide it with a monopolistic status for all practical purposes. BCCI tinkers with the fundamental rights of citizens pertaining to their right of speech or right of occupation, and has a final say in several matters such as those of registration of players, umpires and others connected with the game of cricket, which is extremely popular in the country. 6.15 By virtue of being the organisers of competitive cricket between one association and another or representing different States or different organisations having the status of State, making bye-laws for the same BCCI is de facto legislating on `sport' related activities. This is essentially a State function in terms of Entry 33 List II of the Seventh Schedule of the Constitution. Additionally, BCCI enjoys State patronage as a national federation, conferred by the Central Government. This necessitates and justifies the application of a different test.161
1. With BCCI, one finds an entity permitted de facto by the State to represent the country at the international stage. BCCI selects the `Indian Team', and the selected players wear the national colours.162
2. ICC recognises BCCI as the `official' body representing India.
3. Neither the Government, nor BCCI have ever sought to challenge, discuss or change the aforesaid status.
4. BCCI practically enjoys a monopolistic status in controlling and regulating the game of cricket in India. BCCI controls the policy formulation related to cricket and its implementation, affecting the country at large, which is essentially a State function.163
5. BCCI and its actions/activities, directly and indirectly, affect the fundamental rights of citizens, players, and other functionaries.6.18 The aforementioned points bear a striking resemblance to a `State-like' entity wielding `State-like' powers. In light of these facts, it is difficult to convince oneself that BCCI does not fall within the definition of `State' under Article 12. 6.19 Moreover, the doctrine of contemporaneaexpositio entails that "the best meaning of a statute or document is the one given by those who enacted it or signed it, and that the meaning publicly given by contemporary or long professional usage is presumed to be the correct one, even if the language may have a popular or an etymological meaning that is very different."164 This rule has been applied by the Supreme Court in several cases. However, the Court added words of caution that such a rule must give way where the language of the statute is plain and unambiguous.165
The `public function' cases. -When the State `merely' authorizes a given `private' action - imagine a green light at a street corner authorizing pedestrians to cross if they wish - that action cannot automatically become one taken under `State authority' in any sense that makes the Constitution applicable. Which authorizations have that Constitution-triggering effect will necessarily turn on the character of the decision-making responsibility thereby placed (or left) in private hands. However, described, there must exist a category of responsibilities regarded at any given time as so `public' or `governmental' that their discharge by private persons, pursuant to State authorization even though not necessarily in accord with State direction, is subject to the federal constitutional norms that would apply to public officials discharging those same responsibilities. For example, deciding to cross the street when a police officer says you may is not such a `public function'; but authoritatively deciding who is free to cross and who must stop is a `public function' whether or not the person entrusted under State law to perform that function wears a police uniform and is paid a salary from State revenues or wears civilian garb and serves as a volunteer crossing guard... .6.23 With respect to regulation of cricket in India, it is true that there exists no such legislation, Central or State. BCCI took on the role of regulating the game, makes laws to that effect, which were allowed by the State. Justice Sinha further observed that many public duties are prescribed by the courts rather than laid down by the Legislature, and some can even be said to be assumed voluntarily. Some statutory public duties are "prescriptive patterns of conduct" in the sense that they are "treated as duties to act reasonably so that the prescription in these cases is indeed provided by the courts, not merely recognised by them."168
Conclusions and Recommendations7.1 The preceding chapters of this Report, with the aid of various tools of interpretation, binding precedents, judgements/decisions having a persuasive value, rules of construction and juristic writings, arrives at a conclusion that BCCI ought to be classified as `State' within the meaning of Article 12 of the Constitution. An analysis of the functioning of BCCI also shows that the Government does exercise control over its activities and functioning. As was argued in the Zee Telefilms case that BCCI, falling in line with the foreign policy of India, did not recognise a player from South Africa due to their practice of apartheid; and that the cricket matches between India and Pakistan in view of tense international relations were made subject to Government approval. The foregoing positions BCCI as a `limb of the state', and it should, therefore, be held to be `State'. 7.2 The case law discussed in the preceding chapters also sheds light on the threshold of `control' that the Government is required to have on a body under section 2(h) of the RTI Act. It can be deduced from the same that such `control' is much lower in magnitude than what is required under Article 12 of the Constitution. Thus, the threshold for `public authority' being lower than that of `State' under Article 12, bastions the argument that BCCI would have to be covered under the RTI regime. 7.3 Moreover, even if BCCI is continued to be regarded as a private body, but owing to its monopolistic character coupled with the public nature of its functions and the `substantial financing' it has received from appropriate Governments over the years (in the form of tax exemptions, land grants et al) it can, within the existing legal framework, still be termed as a `public authority' and be brought within the purview of the RTI Act. 7.4 In addition to the above, there are certain other relevant factors that ought to be taken into consideration apriori the recommendations of the Commission, which are as follows:
• The uniform of the players of the Indian team (as selected by BCCI) contains the national colours and their helmets display the Ashok Chakra.173
• BCCI, though not a NSF, nominates cricketers for the Arjuna Awards etc.174
• The Parliament and the State Legislatures chose not to enact a legislation to govern the sport of cricket reflecting tacit recognition on the issue afforded to BCCI.175 Recently, the Apex Court reaffirmed that BCCI is the "approved" national level body holding virtually monopoly rights to organize cricketing events in the country.176
(1) Non-consideration of the role played by BCCI as monopolistic in regulation of the game of cricket has resulted in the Board flying under the radar of public scrutiny, encouraged an environment of opacity and non-accountability. In the past, this has probably given an impression in the minds of the general public that corruption and other forms of malpractices are adversely affecting one of the most popular sports played in India. BCCI exercises `State-like' powers affecting the fundamental rights of the stakeholders, guaranteed under Part III of the Constitution. It is hereby recommended that BCCI be viewed as an agency or instrumentality of State, under Article 12 of the Constitution, thereby making it amenable to the writ jurisdiction of the Supreme Court under Article 32.
(2) Human rights are sacrosanct and innately associated with the human personality. These rights are continually evolving, are to be respected by, and can be enforced against not only the `State' but also private bodies/entities. Therefore, the BCCI should be held accountable, under all circumstances, for any violations of basic human rights of the stakeholders.
(3) BCCI virtually acts as a National Sports Federation (NSF). Its own Memorandum of Association states that the Board's objects and purposes are to control, improve quality, lay down policies pertaining to the game of cricket in India as well as select teams to represent India at international fora. Moreover, as per the statement made in the Lok Sabha, the Central Government has already been regarding BCCI as a National Sports Federation and hence, it is recommended that, for the removal of any doubt, the same be explicitly mentioned in the list of NSFs available on the ministry's website. This express mention would automatically bring BCCI within the purview of RTI Act. Other sports bodies listed as NSFs' in Annual Report 2016-17,177 of the Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports available on its website do attract the provisions of the RTI Act. This website also contains information regarding (Chief Public Information Officer) CPIOs and Appellate Authorities catering to RTI requests addressed to specific NSFs.178
List of CasesDomestic Cases
1. A.C. Muthiah v. Board of Control for Cricket in India &Anr., (2011) 6 SCC 617. [Supreme Court].
2. Air India Statutory Corporation &Ors. v. United Labour Union &Ors., (1997) 9 SCC 377. [Supreme Court].
3. Ajay Hasia v. Khalid Mujib Sehravardi, AIR 1981 SC 487. [Supreme Court].
4. Ajay Jadeja v. Union of India &Ors., (2002) 95 DLT 14.[Delhi High Court]
5. Andi Mukta Sadguru Shree Mukta Jeevandas Swami Suvarna Jayanti Mahotsav Smarak Trust v. V.R. Rudani, AIR 1989 SC 1607. [Supreme Court].
6. Bangalore Water Supply and Sewerage Board v. A. Rajappa, AIR 1978 SC 548. [Supreme Court].
7. Bennet Coleman& Co. v. Union of India, AIR 1973 SC 106. [Supreme Court].
8. Bharat Coop. Bank (Mumbai) Ltd. v. Coop. Bank Employees Union, (2007) 4 SCC 685. [Supreme Court].
9. Binny Ltd. v. V. Sadasivan, (2005) 6 SCC 657. [Supreme Court].
10. Board of Control for Cricket v. Cricket Association of Bihar &Ors.,(2015) 3 SCC 251.[Supreme Court].
11. Board of Control for Cricket, India & Anr. v. Netaji Cricket Club &Ors., AIR 2005 SC 592. [Supreme Court].
12. C.I.T. A.P. v. Taj Mahal Hotel, AIR 1972 SC 168; [Supreme Court].
13. Chander Mohan Khanna v. National Council of Educational Research and Training, AIR 1992 SC 76. [Supreme Court].
14. CIT v. Desia Vidyashala Samiti Shimoga, ITA No. 1133 of 2008, dated 02.08.2011.[Karnataka High Court].
15. CIT v. Indian Institute of Management, 2014 SCC (2014) 226 TAXMAN 301 (Kar) [Karnataka High Court].
16. CIT v. Parley Plastics Ltd., 322 ITR 63 (Bom.).[Bombay High Court].
17. Committee of Management, Azad Memorial Poorva Madhyamik Vidyalaya, Koloura v. State of Uttar Pradesh, AIR 2008 (NOC) 2641 (All). [Allahabad High Court].
18. Darbari v. PIO, Willington Gymkhana Club, CIC/SH/A/2014/000684. [decided on 04.12.2017. Central Information Commission].
19. Dhara Singh Girls High School through its Manager, Virendra Chaudhary v. State of Uttar Pradesh &Ors., AIR 2008 All 92. [Allahabad High Court].
20. Dinesh Trivedi, MP &Ors. v. Union of India &Ors., (1997) 4 SCC 306. [Supreme Court].
21. Federal Bank Ltd. v. Sagar Thomas, AIR 2003 SC 4325. [Supreme Court].
22. G. Bassi Reddy v. International Crops Research Institute, AIR 2003 SC 1764. [Supreme Court].
23. General Manager, Kisan Sahkari Chini Mills Ltd., Sultanpur, Uttar Pradesh v. Satrughan Nishad, (2003) 8 SCC 639. [Supreme Court].
24. High Court of Judicature for Rajasthan v. Ramesh Chand Paliwal, AIR 1998 SC 1079. [Supreme Court].
25. Indian Olympic Association v. Veerish Malik & Ors., ILR (2010) 4 Del 1.[Delhi High Court].
26. Indian Railway Welfare Organisation v. D.M. Gautam, (2010) 169 DLT 508.[Delhi High Court].
27. Jeeja Ghosh & Anr. v. Union of India & Ors.,AIR 2016 SC 2393.[Supreme Court].
28. K. Ramanathan v. State of Tamil Nadu, AIR 1985 SC 660. [Supreme Court].
29. Krishak Bharti Cooperative Ltd. v. Ramesh Chander Bawa, (2010) 118 DRJ 176.[Delhi High Court].
30. LIC of India v. Consumer Education and Research Centre, AIR 1995 SC 1811. [Supreme Court].
31. M.P. Varghese v. Mahatma Gandhi University, AIR 2007 Ker 230.[Kerela High Court].
32. Madan Mohan Choudhary v. State of Bihar, (1999) 3 SCC 396. [Supreme Court].
33. Mohinder Amarnath & Ors. v. BCCI, CW.NO.632/89.[decided on 23.08.1989. Delhi High Court].
34. Mother Dairy Fruit and Vegetable Private Limited v. Hatim Ali & Ors.,AIR 2015 Delhi 132 [Delhi High Court].
35. Munish Kumar Seth v. Public Information Officer, 2012(3) RCR (Civil) 660. [Punjab State Consumer Disputes Redressal Commission].
36. N.D.P. Namboodripad v. Union of India, (2007) 4 SCC 502. [Supreme Court].
37. Nagar Yuwak Shikshan Sanstha v. Maharashtra State Information Commission, AIR 2010 Bom 1.[Bombay High Court].
38. National Stock Exchange of India Limited v. Central Information Commission & Ors., (2010) 100 SCL 464 (Del) [Delhi High Court].
39. P. Kasilingam v. P.S.G. College of Technology, AIR 1995 SC 1395.[Supreme Court].
40. Panjabrao Deshmukh Urban Co-operative Bank Ltd. (Dr.) v. State Information Commissioner, Vidarbha Region, Nagpur, AIR 2009 Bom 75.[Bombay High Court].
41. People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 2003 SC 2363. [Supreme Court].
42. People's Union for Civil Liberties (PUCL) & Anr. v. Union of India, AIR 2004 SC 1442.[Supreme Court].
43. Ponds India Ltd. v. Commissioner of Trade Tax, 2008 (8) SCC 369. [Supreme Court].
44. Population Services International v. Rajesh Dhiman, W.P.(C) 3422/2012. [decided on 16.09.2013.Delhi High Court].
45. Pradeep Kumar Biswas v. Indian Institute of Chemical Biology, (2002) 5 SCC 111. [Supreme Court].
46. Praga Tools Corporation v. C.V. Imanual, AIR 1969 SC 1306. [Supreme Court].
47. Prasar Bharati v. Amarjeet Singh, (2007) 9 SCC 539. [Supreme Court].
48. Principal, M.D. Sanatan Dharam Girls College, Ambala City &Anr. v. State Information Commissioner, Haryana &Anr., AIR 2008 P&H 101. [Punjab and Haryana High Court].
49. R.K. Jain &Ors. v. lndian Bank Association (lBA), Complaint Nos. CIC/MP/C/2015/000044 and CIC/SH/C/2016/000123. [decided on 13.11.2017. Central Information Commission].
50. Rahul Mehra & Anr. v. Union of India, (2004) 78 DRJ 155 (DB).[Delhi High Court].
51. Rajasthan State Electricity Board, Jaipur v. Mohan Lal, AIR 1967 SC 1857. [Supreme Court].
52. Ramana Dayaram Shetty v. International Airports Authority of India, AIR 1979 SC 1628. [Supreme Court].
53. Regional Director v. High Land Coffee Works of P.F.X. Saldah, 1991(3) SCC 617. [Supreme Court].
54. Reliance Petrochemicals Ltd. v. Proprietors of Indian Express, AIR 1989 SC 190.[Supreme Court].
55. S.P. Gupta v. Union of India, AIR 1982 SC 149. [Supreme Court].
56. Sabhajit Tewary v. Union of India, AIR 1975 SC 1329. [Supreme Court].
57. Secretary, Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, Government of India &Ors. v. Cricket Association of Bengal &Ors., AIR 1995 SC 1236.[Supreme Court].
58. Sh. Surinder Singh Barmi v. Board for Control of Cricket in India (BCCI), Case No.61/2010.[ decided on 08.02.2013. Competition Commission of India].
59. Shikha Singh v. Tuberculosis Association of India, File No: CIC/AD/C/2010/001271 [decided on 29.1.2011.Central Information Commission.]
60. Shri Subhash Chandra Aggarwal & Shri Anil Bairwal v. Indian National Congress/All India Congress Committee &Ors., 2013 (3) RCR (Civil) 400. [Central Information Commission].
61. Som Prakash Rekhi v. Union of India, AIR 1981 SC 212. [Supreme Court].
62. South Gujarat Roofing Tiles Manufactures Association v. State of Gujarat, (1977) SC 90. [Supreme Court].
63. State of Uttar Pradesh v. Raj Narain & Ors., AIR 1975 SC 865.[Supreme Court].
64. State of West Bengal v. Nripendra Nath Bagchi, AIR 1966 SC 447. [Supreme Court].
65. Subhash Chandra Agrawal v. PIO, Department of Sports, CIC/LS/C/2012/000565. [decided on 16.06.2017.Central Information Commission].
66. Sukhdev Singh v. Bhagatram Sardar Singh Raghuvanshi, AIR 1975 SC 1331.[Supreme Court].
67. Tamil Nadu Road Development Company Ltd. v. Tamil Nadu Information Commission, (2008) 6 Mad LJ 737. [Madras High Court].
68. Thalappalam Service Coop. Bank Ltd. & Ors. v. State of Kerela & Ors., 2014 (1) ALLMR 451 : (2013) 16SCC 82. [Supreme Court].
69. The Hindu Urban Cooperative Bank Ltd. v. The State Information Commission & Ors., (2011) 2 P&H 64. [Punjab and Haryana High Court]
70. Union of India v. Board of Control for Cricket in India & Ors., 2017 (9) SCALE 400 [Supreme Court].
71. Visvesvaraya Technological University v. Assistant Commissioner of Income Tax, (2016) 12 SCC 258. [Supreme Court].
72. Yoginath D. Bagde v. State of Maharashtra, (1999) 7 SCC 739. [Supreme Court].
73. Zee Telefilms Ltd. v. Union of India, AIR 2005 SC 2677: (2005) 4 SCC 649. [Supreme Court].Foreign Cases
1. Abdelhamid Benhadj and Ali Benhadj v. Algeria, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/90/D/1173/2003. [Human Rights Committee].
2. Aston Cantlow and Wilmcote with Billesley Parochial Church Council v. Wallbank,  UKHL 37. [House of Lords].
3. Bank of New South Wales v. Commonwealth, (1948) 76 CLR 1. [High Court of Australia].
4. Chirwa v. Transnet Limited and Ors.,  ZACC 23. [High Court of South Africa, Eastern Cape Local Division, Mthatha]. 5. Costello-Roberts v. United Kingdom, 247-C Eur. Ct. H.R. (ser. A) (1993). [European Court of Human Rights].
6. Finnigan v. New Zealand Rugby Football Union Inc.,  2 NZLR 159. [Court of Appeal New Zealand].
7. Franz Nahlik v. Austria, Communication No. 608/1995, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/57/D/608/1995 (1996). [Human Rights Committee].
8. Gough v. Gough, (1891) 2 QB 665. [Queen's Bench].
9. Palser v. Grimling, (1948) 1 All ER 1, 11 (HL). [House of Lords].
10. Poplar Housing and Regeneration Community Association Ltd v. Donoghue,  Q.B. 48.[Queen's Bench].
11. Storck v. Germany, 2005-V Eur. Ct. H.R. [European Court of Human Rights].
12. Sychev v. Ukraine, App. No.4773/02 (2005) (unreported). [European Court of Human Rights].
13. Tae Hoon Park v. Republic of Korea, U.N. Doc. CCPR/C/64/D/628/1995. [Human Rights Committee].
14. William Eduardo Delgado Paez v. Colombia, U. N. Doc. CCPR/C/39/D/195/1985 (1990). [Human Rights Committee]. 15. Wo? v. Poland, 2005-IV Eur. Ct. H.R. [European Court of Human Rights].
List of Abbreviations
1. A.P. - Andhra Pradesh
2. AICC - All India Congress Committee
3. AIR - All India Reporter
4. All. - Allahabad
5. Anr. - Another
6. BCCI - Board of Control for Cricket in India
7. BJP - Bharatiya Janta Party
8. Bom. - Bombay
9. BSP - Bahujan Samaj Party
10. CAR - Civil Aviation Requirements
11. CBI - Central Bureau of Investigation
12. CIC - Central Information Commission
13. CIT - Commissioner of Income Tax
14. Coop. - Cooperative
15. CPI - Communist Party of India
16. CPI(M) - Communist Party of India (Marxist)
17. Ct. - Court
18. Del. - Delhi
19. DGCA - Directorate General Civil Aviation
20. Doc. - Document
21. ECHR - European Court of Human Rights
22. ECOSOC - Economic and Social Council
23. Edn. - Edition
24. Eur. - European
25. FDI - Foreign Direct Investment
26. FIFA - The Fédération Internationale de Football Association
27. FOI - Freedom of Information
28. GDP - Gross Domestic Product
29. HC - High Court
30. HL - House of Lords
31. HR - Human Rights
32. IBA - Indian Banking Association
33. Ibid - Ibidem (is used to refer to an authority in the footnote immediately preceding the current footnote and the same page/ place is being referred to.)
34. ICC - International Cricket Council
35. ICCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights
36. Id. - Idem (is used if the authority is the same but the page or place of reference is different.)
37. IFC - Industrial Finance Corporation
38. IHRB - Institute for Human Rights and Business
39. IMF - International Monetary Fund
40. INC - Indian National Congress
41. INR - Indian Rupee
42. Jrnl. - Journal
43. Ker. - Kerela
44. L. Rev. - Law Review
45. LIC - Life Insurance Corporation
46. LJ - Law Journal
47. M.P. - Member of Parliament
48. Mad. - Madras
49. NCP - Nationalist Congress Party
50. NCRWC - National Commission to Review the Working of the Constitution
51. NGO - Non-Government Organisation
52. NHRC - National Human Rights Commission
53. NSF - National Sports Federation
54. OHCHR - Office of the High Commissioner of Human Rights
55. ONGC - Oil & Natural Gas Commission
56. Ors. - Others
57. P&H - Punjab and Haryana
58. PIO - Public Information Officer
59. PPP - Public-Private Partnership
60. PUCL - People's Union for Civil Liberties
61. QB - Queen's Bench
62. RTI - Right to Information
63. SBI - State Bank of India
64. SC - Supreme Court
65. SCC - Supreme Court cases
66. SDG - Sustainable Development Goal
67. Supra - used to refer to a prior footnote
68. UDHR - Universal Declaration of Human Rights
69. UK - United Kingdom
70. UN - United Nations
71. UNESCAP - United Nations Economic and Social Commission in Asia and the Pacific
72. UNHRC - United Nations Human Rights Committee
73. UPA - United Progressive Alliance
74. v. - versus
I - MoA of BCCI1. The name of the Association is "THE BOARD OF CONTROL FOR CRICKET IN INDIA" and it shall hereafter be referred to as the "BCCI". 2. The objects and purposes of the BCCI are:
(a) To control and improve quality and standards of the game of Cricket in India, lay down policies, roadmaps, guidelines and make rules and regulations (and amend or alter them) in all matters relating to the game of Cricket[emphasis added], recognizing that the primary stakeholders are the players and Cricket fans in India, and that accountability, transparency and integrity of the Game are the core values;
(b) To provide for measures necessary for promotion and development of the game of Cricket, welfare and interest of Cricketers and elimination of unethical and unfair practices in the Game of cricket; and for that purpose, organize coaching schemes, establish coaching academies, hold tournaments, exhibition matches, Test Matches, ODIs, Twenty/20, and any other matches and take all other required steps;
(c) To strive for sportsmanship and professionalism in the game of Cricket and its governance and administration; inculcate principles of transparency and ethical standards in players, team officials, umpires and administrators; and to ban doping, age fraud, sexual harassment and all other forms of inequity and discrimination;
(d) To encourage the formation of State, Regional or other Cricket Associations and the organization of Inter-State and other Tournaments; to lay down norms for recognition which achieve uniformity in the structure, functioning and processes of the Member Associations;
(e) To arrange, control, regulate and if necessary, finance visits of Teams that are Members of the International Cricket Council and teams of other Countries to India;
(f) To arrange, control, regulate and finance, visits of Indian Cricket Teams to tour countries that are members of the International Cricket Council or elsewhere in conjunction with the bodies governing cricket in the countries to be visited[emphasis added];
(g) To select teams to represent India[emphasis added] in Test Matches, One Day Internationals, Twenty/20 matches and in any other format in India or abroad as the BCCI may decide from time to time;
(h) To foster the spirit of sportsmanship and the ideals of cricket amongst school, college and university students and others and to educate them regarding the same;
(i) To appoint India's representative/s on the International Cricket Council, as also to Conferences and Seminars connected with the game of Cricket;
(j) To appoint Managers and/or other team officials for the Indian Teams;
(k) To employ and appoint CEOs, professional managers, auditors, executive secretaries, administrative officers, assistant secretaries, managers, clerks, team support staff, players, and other service personnel and staff; and to remunerate them for their services, by way of salaries, wages, gratuities, pensions, honoraria, ex-gratia payments and/or provident fund; and to remove/terminate or dismiss such employees or personnel;
(l) To ensure that tickets to cricket matches are widely available well in advance of the matches to members of the public at reasonable rates, and to prevent distribution of the same as largesse; and also to offer seats gratis or at nominal rates to students;
(m) To lay out cricket grounds and to provide pavilion, canteen and other facilities and amenities for the convenience and benefit of the members, players, and the Cricket fans including the women and the disabled, and to ensure the availability of Cricket gear and amenities to Cricket players;
(n) To constitute Committees, from time to time, and entrust or delegate its functions and duties to such Committees, for achieving the objects of the BCCI;
(o) To vest immovable properties and funds of the BCCI in Trustees appointed by it, for carrying out the objects of the BCCI;
(p) To sell, manage, mortgage, lease, exchange, dispose of or otherwise deal with all or any property of the BCCI;
(q) To acquire or purchase properties - movable and immovable, and assets - tangible and intangible, and to apply the capital and income therefrom and the proceeds of the sale or transfer thereof, for or towards all or any of the objects of the BCCI;
(r) To collect funds, and wherever necessary, borrow with or without security and to purchase, redeem or pay off any such securities;
(s) To carry out any other activity which may seem to the BCCI capable of being conveniently carried on in connection with the above, or calculated directly or indirectly to enhance the value or render profitable or generate better income/revenue, from any of the properties, assets and rights of the BCCI;
(t) To promote, protect and assist the Players who are the primary agents of the game by:
(i) Creating a Players' Association to be funded by the BCCI;
(ii) Being sensitive to Players' before international calendars are drawn up so that sufficient time is provided for rest and recovery;
(iii) Taking steps, particularly on longer tours, so the emotional wellbeing and family bonds of the Players' are strengthened;
(iv) Compulsorily having qualified Physiotherapists, Mental Conditioning Coaches / Counsellors and Nutritionists among the Team's support staff;
(v) Having a single point of contact on the logistics and managerial side so that Players' can fully concentrate on the game;
(vi) Registering all duly qualified agents to ensure there is oversight and transparency in player representation;
(vii) Offering appropriate remuneration of an international standard when representing the country on the international stage, and always recalling that national representation has priority over club or franchise;
(u) To grant/donate such sum/s for:
(i) Such causes as would be deemed fit by the BCCI conducive to the promotion of the game of Cricket;
(ii) The benefit of Cricketers or their spouses and children by introducing benevolent fund schemes or other benefit schemes, as the BCCI deems fit, subject to its rules and regulations;
(iii) The benefit of any other persons who have served Cricket or their spouses and children as the BCCI may consider fit;
(iv) To award sponsorships to sportspersons in games other than Cricket for development of their individual skills; and
(v) To donate to any charitable cause;
(v) To start or sponsor and/or to subscribe to funds or stage matches for the benefit of the Cricketers or persons who may have rendered service to the game of Cricket or for their families, or to donate towards the development or promotion of the game and to organize matches in aid of Public Charitable and Relief Funds;
(w) To impart physical education through the medium of Cricket;
(x) To co-ordinate the activities of members and institutions in relation to the BCCI and amongst themselves;
(y) To create and maintain a central repository and database of all Cricketers along with their game statistics;
(z) To introduce a scheme of professionalism and to implement the same;
(aa) To provide a fair and transparent grievance redressal mechanism to players, support personnel and other entities associated with Cricket;
(bb) Generally to do all such other acts and things as may seem to the BCCI to be convenient and/or conducive to the carrying out of the objects of the BCCI.3. The income, funds and properties of the BCCI, however acquired, shall be utilized and applied solely for the promotion of the objects of the BCCI as set forth above to aid and assist financially or otherwise and to promote, encourage, advance and develop and generally to assist the game of cricket or any other sport throughout India. 4. The BCCI shall not be dissolved unless the dissolution is decided upon by a resolution passed at a General Meeting of the BCCI convened for the purpose, by a majority of 3/4th of the Members present and entitled to vote. The quorum for such meeting shall be 2/3rd of the Members who have a right to vote. In the case of dissolution of the BCCI, if there shall remain after satisfaction of all debts and liabilities, any property whatsoever, it shall be given or transferred to some other institution or institutions having objects similar to those of the BCCI and not running for profit.
II - Reply of Hon'ble Minister of State for Youth Affairs and Sports to Unstarred Question No. 2097 in the Lok SabhaUnstarred Question No: 2097 Answered On: 27.03.2012 Sports Federations Under RTI Seema Upadhyay Sushila Saroj Usha Verma Om Prakash Yadav Maheshwar Hazari will the Minister of Youth Affairs and Sports be Pleased to State:
(a) whether the Government proposes to bring various sports association/federations including the Board of Control for Cricket in India (BCCI) under the ambit of the Right to Information Act, 2005 so as to ensure transparency in their functioning;
(b) if so, the details thereof and the response of these federations and BCCI thereon; (c) the progress made by the Government so far in this regard;
(d) whether the BCCI gets various concessions in income tax, custom duty etc. and land at concessional rates for stadia; and
(e) if so, the details thereof during the last three years and the current year?Answer Minister of the State (Independent Charge) in The Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports (Shri Ajay Maken)
(a) to (c) The need for bringing National Sports Federations (NSFs) including BCCI under ambit of Right to Information Act, (RTI) 2005 has been voiced from to time to time. Accordingly Government in April, 2010 declared all the NSFs receiving grant of Rs.10.00 lakhs or more as Public Authority under Section 2(h) of the RTI, 2005. There are major court rulings for treating the National Sports Federation as a public authorities, especially in view of the state-like function discharged by them such as selection of the national team and control and regulation of sports in the country, which also make them amenable to the writ jurisdiction of High Courts under Article 226 of the Constitution of India Notwithstanding the above, the Government has proposed to bring all the National Sports Federations including BCCI under the RTI Act in the proposed Draft National Sports Development Bill, with provision of exclusion clause protecting personal/confidential information relating to athletes.
(d) & (e) In so far as BCCI, in particular, is concerned, Government of India has been treating BCCI as a National Sports Federation and approving the proposal of BCCI for holding the events in India and participation in international events abroad. The Central Government does not extend any direct financial assistance to BCCI. But the Central Government has been granting concessions in income tax, customs duty, etc. to BCCI. The State Governments also have provided land in many places to the Cricket Associations.As per the Section 80(G) 92) (viii) (c) and sum paid by the assesses, being a company, in the previous year as donations to the Indian Olympic Association or to any other association or institutions established in India, as the Central Government may, having regard to the prescribed guidelines, by notifications in the official gazette specify in this behalf for (i) the development of infrastructure for sports and games; (ii) the sponsorship of sports and games. For being eligible under the above Act BCCI was registered under Section 12 (a) read with Section 17 (a) as an charitable institution and was availing tax exemptions. Department of Revenue has informed that the registration granted to BCCI under section 12A of the Act was withdrawn in December 2009 with effect from 1 June, 2006. As such BCCI has availed tax exemptions as a charitable organization till 30.06.2006 as per details given below:
Amount of exemption
III - Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports, Department of Sports' letter number F.No.36-2/2010-SP-II, dated March 30, 2010 `Declaring National Sports Federations as Public Authority'
Government of India
Ministry of Youth Affairs and Supports
(Department of Supports)
New Delhi the 30th March 2010To
(i) National Sports Federations (NSFs) come within the purview of Ministry of Youth Affairs and Sports as per the Allocation of Business Rules, 1961.
(ii) The Ministry recognizes one National level Sports Federation in each discipline for the purpose of development and promotion of their disciplines.
(iii) These federations are fully responsible and accountable for the overall management, direct, control, regulation, promotion, and development of their discipline in the country
(iv) They are expected to collaborate with Ministry of youth Affairs and Sports and Sports Authority of India to develop promotional plan (LTDPs) and activities for the development of their discipline.
(v) There are in turn recognized by the various international federations and also by the India Olympic Association.
(vi) They sever as nodal body for participation of "India" terms in international events.
(vii) They are also responsible for affiliation of State and District Units in the country.
(viii) They receive special attention and privileges from the Government which are otherwise unavailable to such organizations.
(ix) They receive Government funding for various purpose including organization of national championships and training and participation of sportspersons in tournaments in India and abroad, equipments, coaches and other facilities.
(x) The Government grant forms a major part of their budget for promotion and development of their sport, including preparation of the national teams.
(xi) The Government specifies the purpose and manner in which such funding to be utilized and the federation are accountable to the Government for the privileges and funding so received.2. The Government after taking into consideration all above relevant facts all of circumstances, has concluded the National Sports Federations are doing a "State" Function and are dependent on Government funding for performing this task and hence are " substantially financed" by the Government. 3. It has therefore been decide3d to declare all National Sports Federation receive to grant of Rs. 10 lakhs or more as Public Authority under Section 2(h) of the RTI Act, 2005. 4. All NSFs getting covered by this provision are requested to immediately designate Central Public Information Officers and Appellate Authorities as per Section 5 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 and intimate their details to the Ministry. 5. They are further requested to fulfill their obligations of being a Public Authority as per Section 4 of the Right to Information Act, 2005 like maintaining all their records duly catalogued and indexed in a manner so as to facilitate the right to information under this Act and suomoto disclosure/publishing of information pertaining to the federation including the following:
(i) the particulars to their organisation, functions and duties;
(ii) the powers and duties of their officers and employees;
(iii) the rules, regulations, instructions, manuals and records, held by them or under their control or used by their employees for discharging their functions;
(iv) the particulars of any arrangement that exists for consultation with, or representation by, the members of the public in relation to the formulation of their policy or implementation thereof;
(v) all relevant facts while formulating important policies or announcing the decisions which affect public;
(vi) a statement of the boards, councils, committees and other bodies consisting of two or more persons constituted as their part or for the purpose of advice, and as to whether meetings of those boards, councils, committees and other bodies are open to the public, or the minuted of such meetings are accessible for public;
(vii) a directory of their officers and employees;
(viii) the monthly remuneration received by each of their officers and employees including the system of compensation as provided in their regulations;
(ix) the budget allocation within the federation, including the particulars of the plans, proposed expenditures and reports on disbursements made;
(x) particulars of recipients of concessions permits or authorisation granted by then;
(xi) the particulars of facilities available to citizens for obtaining information including the working hours of a library or reading room, if maintained for public use etc;
(xii) such other information as may be prescribed.and thereafter, update this information as may be prescribed 6. The details as outlined above shall be sent to this ministry latest by 15th April 2010 and also be made available on their websites. Compliance to the above instructions is mandatory for a National Sport Federation to become eligible to receive government grant under the Scheme of Assistance to National Sports Federations. 7. This may be treated as most urgent.